September 11: The Death of Democracy in Chile

In the early 1970s the government of the United States of America, with their Chilean allies took a course that would destroy one of the most stable countries in South America. Caught up in the fervor of the Cold War, they set the stage to overthrow the first democratically elected Socialist leader of South America. Setting United States foreign policy for the foreseeable future, and setting back the progress of Chile indefinitely. While the United States did not instigate the coup, actions taken through covert support of the Chilean Armed Forces would set the stage for a chilling era for all Chileans. The September 11, 1973 coup against Salvador Allende is representative of Cold War fanaticism within the United States government led by President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during the Cold War. This fanaticism was brought on by the belief that Allende’s regime would become an anchor for Communism in South America and ruin the Chilean economy in the process.

Historians Claudia Kedar and Thomas David Clark discuss the relationship of monetary policy that led to the coup. Specifically, Kedar explores Salvador Allende’s regime and the International Monetary Fund, and Thomas Clark discusses the Chicago Boys’ influence on Chile from the 1950s to the 1970s. Fernando León explores the narratives presented by competing factions of 1970’s Chile. From Paula Molina, we look at a brief history of the Chilean left, and its influence on expectations of Allende. María Del Valle, Barrera Koch, and Benigno Aguirre discuss how the coup is commemorated in Chile each September, in addition to the collective behavior of Chileans before and after the coup. And Manuel Saavedra describes how the coup changed human rights in Latin America.

Chile's left-wing politics stretch back to the nineteenth century to when Francisco Bilbao and his associates founded the Sociedad da la Igualdad (Society of Equality) in 1850. The Sociedad da la Igualdad worked alongside other worker’s organizations to stave off the negative aspects of capitalism to Chile. This would be a recurring them in Chilean politics until 1973. The Chilean political system faced great challenges again in the 1920s. Following the First World War, the demand for nitrate needed to build bombs dropped precipitously. This led to a coup in 1924, and later in 1932 the short-lived Socialist Republic of Chile. While the Socialist Republic of Chile did not last long, it allowed for the Communist Party (PC) and Socialist Party (PS) to gain seats in the Chilean legislature. (1)

Salvador Allende was born in Santiago in 1920. He would go on to earn his medical degree from the University of Chile in 1932. While at the university he participated in politics. As a founding member of the Socialist Party in 1933. (2) During this time, he married his wife Hortensia Bussi. The two would have three daughters. In 1937, he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies, and he would later serve as the Minister of Health from 1939 until 1942. Allende would run for the Chilean presidency four times; in 1952, 1958, and 1964. In 1964, he ran for the Popular Action Front (FRAP). The Popular Action Front had been founded in 1956 to unite all of Chile’s leftist parties. (3) Allende would run for the presidency for the final time in 1970 with Popular Unity (UP) party. Leftist politics again gained prominence in 1950s Chile. The population influx during the 1950s led to a strain on affordable housing. This ensuing economic depression lead to Allende being seen as a beacon of hope. (4)

The 1970 election became a monumental moment in Chilean politics, as the election was between three candidates. The National Party abandoned the sitting president, Eduardo Frei, in favor of former president Jorge Alessandri. The Christian Democrats supported their center-left candidate, Radomiro Tomic. With Allende rounding out the ticket for Popular Unity. The Popular Unity was a coalition party made up of the Communists, Socialists, and several non-Marxist parties. The election would come out with Allende on top with 36.5 percent, Alessandri with 35.2 percent, and Tomic with 28 percent.

The United States would spend the next two months pressuring the Chilean congress to not ratify Allende’s election and to foster a coup led by Alessandri. (5) The Central Intelligence Agency’s view of the Chilean congress capitulating to the United States’ demands was not positive, as reflected in one of their earlier reports:

Prospects for inducing Congress to vote for Alessandri rather than Allende were never bright and, they focused on inspiring a reluctant, indecisive President Frei to assume an out-of-character role: dynamic leadership within his own party, with the “persuadables” in Congress, and with the military. Frei was under no illusion about Chile’s fate under an Allende regime. "Chile has a very short future, and after 4 November it will only have a past," remarked Frei on the incoming Allende administration. (6)

Frei had no idea how prescient his words would become. Beginning September 15, 1970, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger would throw forward the throttle with the Central Intelligence Agency taking the main workload of operations in Chile. Yet, Henry Kissinger would work to keep Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, out of the loop. Kissinger also worked to keep most of the Intelligence Community out of back-channel networks. (7) This was due to a shared distrust of the Agency by President Nixon and Kissinger.

Once Allende took power, Kissinger enacted a virtual blockade of international aid to Chile. Coordinating with other governments, such as Brazil, as well as using United States voting power in the Export-Import Bank, World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to prevent western and nonwestern aid from reaching Chile. (8) The only lender that would keep relations with Allende’s Chile was the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.). According to Claudia Kedar, the Allende regime had a good working relationship with the Fund. However, the Fund’s “stand-by-arrangements” were crippling the economy of Chile. Chileans perceived the International Monetary Fund as an extension of U.S. foreign policy. This was despite the organization being a lender of last resort. The Fund had established several “stand-by-agreements” with previous Chilean administrations. The foreign influence of the Fund was often seen as imperialist. (9) Beginning in 1970, Allende worked with the I.M.F. to accept less extortionist debt measures. However, the U.S. was working behind the scenes with some of the debt owners to delay or block Chile’s debt consolidation efforts. In the end, the Fund saw Allende’s position with Chilean debt management and expropriations as a sign of economic strength, not weakness. (10)

The Chicago Boys were influential Chilean economists who helped set fiscal policy before and after the coup. They represent two ways of analyzing public policy, both overt and covert. The overt being the technical level, where policymakers privatize publicly owned firms or liberalize trade to increase industrial efficiency. (11) At the covert level are sociological objectives. At this level, power is redistributed, and through this, identities are formed. The “Chicago Boys” had their origins in the Chicago School of Economics, under the tutelage of Milton Friedman. At the Chicago School of Economics, they were indoctrinated in the latest neoliberal economics. Upon their return to Chile, they were not well received. They joined in the “Gremialista” movement of the Catholic University under Jaime Guzman. (12) This led to their joining the Edwards Group, and later, the military government. The IMF and the Chicago Boys became the countervailing economic forces in Allende's Chile. By looking at the economic plan Allende had for Chile, and how they did not agree with United States interests, we see how they were not categorically anti-capitalist, but rather went against the interests of US corporations. But looking at the coup against Allende, we also see another example of how the Nixon administration was running unrestrained with blinders on.

In moments of profound consciousness and at other times confounding introspection, we see that the United States administration did not go lightly into the breach. But they did couch their decisions in the language of the Cold War, as they conducted the operation with the same callousness of a surgeon removing a tumor. As notes from a National Security Council meeting on November 5, 1970, demonstrates, “We do not want to risk turning nationalism against us and damaging our image, credibility, and position in the world… damaging our credibility in the eyes of the rest of the world as interventionist…”(13) Here we see that Kissinger was aware of the image that supporting the coup would create. Yet, he has to balance that with what is believed to be the stance the United States has to project to the world. In this, they have to repress all notions of Western and Capitalist weakness. In another passage from the same meeting, “The example of a successful elected Marxist government in Chile would surely have an impact— even precedent value for—other parts of the world, especially in Italy…”(14) This contrasts with the United States post- World War Two stance of anti-colonialism. Later in the same meeting, we see this dichotomy play out further, as Kissinger expresses, “We are strongly on record in support of self-determination and respect for free election; you are firmly on the record for non-intervention in the internal affairs of this hemisphere and accepting of nations ‘as they are.’”(15) Undeterred by their ideology, they pressed on.

On September 15, 1970, the Central Intelligence Agency began making its way into Chile. They inserted agents that had the appearance, language, cultural, and professional bona fides to blend into the Chilean landscape. Additionally, they used assets that were already in place. In one instance the Central Intelligence Agency was able, “By a special (and unique) arrangement requested...the US Army Attaché in Santiago was placed under the operational direction of the CIA Chief of Station there. His assistance and Chilean military contacts were invaluable in this program.”(16) The military exchange officers stationed in the country would give some of the first reports in 1973. The advantage of Military Attaches was that they already had diplomatic cover. Thus, there was no need to change their official mission. This became increasingly important over the following three years as the Chilean Armed Forces began their plot. The majority of the Agency’s assets arrived as "journalists". This was ostensibly due to Allende’s anti-media stance. According to declassified National Security documents, Allende became hostile to the free press of Chile almost as soon as he took office.

The main obstacle to any coup in Chile was the military’s tradition of upholding the Constitution. This held no matter the administration that was in power and had held in all previous coups. No matter if they came from the right or the left. This was a hurdle that any successful coup would have to overcome. It required all branches of the Chilean Armed Forces to agree to the coup. If one took action any of the others did not support, they ran the risk of the others leading a counter-coup. This precipitated the need for not only the Chilean Congress to capitulate to the foreign influence, but also the military. This would set the stage for the victim of the first coup attempt. In September 1970, the US presented President Frei with an opportunity for a coup to keep him in power, “Yet, when a coup opportunity and situation presented itself upon the assassination of Army Commander in Chief Schneider, Frei moved quickly away from it.”(17) The Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, General Rene Schneider, fell victim to the first coup attempt during a botched kidnapping attempt. (18) In August 1973, Schneider’s successor, Carlos Prats, would fall victim to character assassination for his support of the Schneider Doctrine, in addition to an incident involving a protestor. The Schneider Doctrine was the political doctrine of General Schneider reaffirming his belief in the apolitical nature of the military. With Prats's resignation on August 23, the coup plotters were able to get their co-conspirator, Augusto Pinochet, in the seat of Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army.

Allende’s final day began at 7 am, on September 11, 1973, when the Chilean Navy seized the port of Valparaiso. After capturing the port, the Air Force and Army set about cutting- off all remaining lines of communication. Leading to Allende's inability to reach his last remaining ally in the Armed Forces, Admiral Montero. The confusion was further exacerbated by General Augusto Pinochet and General Gustavo Leigh (Chilean Air Force) not answering their phones. The only members of the Armed Forces to answer were Jose Maria Sepulveda and Alfredo Joignant, the General Director of the Carabineros and the Investigations Police. After receiving the call from their president, they rushed to the Presidential Palace, La Moneda. In the meantime, Defense Minister Letelier had been arrested at the Ministry of Defense, now under the control of Admiral Patricio Carvajal.

In the hours that followed, Allende would make his stand. According to U.S. intelligence at the time, “Allende’s hope was to surround the Moneda with thousands of Chilean students and workers on the supposition that the Armed Forces would not shoot their way past unarmed citizens. A somewhat similar play had worked during the coup d’état ‘rehearsal’ on 29 June 1973. It didn’t work this time. The military had all roads to Santiago blocked.”(19) This was indicative of the Chilean Army’s lessons learned in the previous years leading to the coup. Allende was as adept at planning for a possible coup, as they were at planning the coup. As the Carabineros surrounded La Moneda, appearing to remain loyal, Allende took to the radio. Allende would give four radio speeches over the next two hours. He encouraged Chileans to resist the coup, and defend the constitution. Over the five-hour siege of La Moneda, Allende would attempt to get his supporters to leave. Additionally, the Armed Forces would offer him free passage out of the country for him and his family. Allende would refuse each one. After several hours his supporters would evacuate the building at 1:55 in the afternoon. Allende had promised to bring up the rear but instead headed for the drawing-room. Here he would take his own life with the AK-47 he had been given by Fidel Castro. This would not be the final casualty of the day. September 11, 1973, would not merely be the death of Chilean democracy, but also of its culture. The first victim of the war against Chilean culture was politician, patriot, and poet Pablo Neruda, who died under suspicious circumstances on the evening of September 11 of suspected poisoning.

In the aftermath of the coup, the Chilean Junta began to justify their actions within and out of Chile. The Chileans who received aid from the CIA justified the overthrow with a document called the “White Book.” The “White Book” was a supposed plan to exterminate all high-level right-wing government agents. This was supposedly called “Plan Z.” The CIA dispelled this as a disinformation campaign by the Junta. (20) They wrote, “The Chilean leaders justify these executions as entirely legal in the application of martial law, under that they declared to be a ‘state of siege’ in time of war.”(21) The execution of the Junta’s opposition began immediately after the fall of La Moneda. The Carabineros began to round up the remaining members of the Popular Unity party. This put the U.S. in a precarious situation. They had given material and political support to a Junta that now appeared to be committing human rights abuses. As early as October 1, they began to discuss how the US would relate to the Junta. As Henry Kissinger, now Secretary of State, states in the meeting from that day, “That so far as the new government of Chile is concerned, we should not support moves against them by seeming to disassociate ourselves from the Chileans and on the other hand, should not be in a position of defending what they are doing.”(22) Early on, the discrepancies in the number of deaths reported, ranged from 284 to 2700 deaths. They also discuss whether Cuba would bring the coup up at the next U.N. meeting. (23) Cuba would not bring the subject up again after September 18. This was due to the U.S. and Chile accusing Cuba of training guerrillas in Chile. While the world did not know the falsehood of this, Cuba’s attempts at exporting revolution were publicly known. This held water as it had only been six years since Che Guevara's death in Bolivia. And in Cold War terms, that may have well been yesterday. Pinochet’s regime would be in power for the next 16 years. And at no time during his reign would Chile live up to the economic dreams that Kissinger and other neoliberal zealots had hoped for.

In the initial aftermath of the coup, it appeared to be the economic success the U.S. had hoped for. However, by 1975 the economic shock had created a depression, reducing national output by 15 percent. Wages dropped to one-third their pre-1970 level, and unemployment rose by 20 percent. The Chilean economy lagged behind pre-1970 at 1.5 percent GDP, compared to the 2.3 percent in the 1960s. The 1.5 percent GDP from 1974 to 1980 lagged behind the rest of Latin America’s 4.3 percent. And was much lower than Chile’s 1960s 4.5 percent. From 1970 to 1980 Chile’s per capita GDP was one-fifth that of other Latin American countries. And in the 1980s, Chile took a GDP drop of 12.9 percent vice the mere 4.3 percent of Latin America as a whole. (24) This intern led to protests against the government, fueling government reprisals and the Human Rights abuses that would follow.

One of the first to speak out against the abuses was Orlando Letelier. In 1976, Letelier wrote an article discussing the contradictory nature of the coups fallout. He lambasts against the U.S. providing a 33 million-dollar loan to the Junta, “based on purely technical criteria.”(25) This attitude was further exacerbated by Secretary of the Treasury, William Simon, congratulating Pinochet on bringing “economic freedom to the Chilean people.”(26) In his article, Letelier presents what would become the norm for Chile from 1973-1990. The following decade and a half would be filled with the competing narratives of different factions. The left presented themselves as martyrs for Chilean independence and the workers. With Allende as their chief martyr. They mourned the end of the only democratically elected socialist president in South America. The right depicted themselves as defenders of “the Fatherland.” Defenders there to maintain Chile’s sovereignty and dignity against Marxist encroachment. For the Centrists, it was a time to neutralize and depoliticize all attempts of the Junta to remain in power. (27)

The coup transformed Chile into an Authoritarian's paradise, which resulted in a humanitarian hell for Chileans. During the reign of Pinochet, political dissidents would be murdered, imprisoned, or disappear without warning. Many remain missing to this day. The light in the darkness was the integration of humanitarian organizations throughout Latin America. While some, such as the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights had been in existence since 1969. (28) These organizations were mainly supported by churches, as they were often the only organizations able to move people and materials into the country. (29)(30) This was the basis of resistance during Pinochet’s reign and would be the conduit of information to the world of the regime's atrocities. The exposure of the Junta’s atrocities would link the U.S. government to the coup long before official government disclosure.

While the United States involvement was not publicly known at the time, it was widely suspected by the Soviet Union and many Non-Aligned countries. The coup against Allende demonstrated to any Non-Aligned country, that to maintain sovereignty, they would have to develop the means of repelling the influence of the United States and its allies. This led many Communist and Non-Aligned countries to form repressive domestic policies and aggressive foreign policies, often involving weapons of mass destruction. In the end, the coup was a failure by the standards expected by the Chicago Boys and Kissinger.

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Other works by this author:

Citations:

1 Paula Vidal Molina “The Notion of Equality in Chile's Communist and Socialist Left, 1960–1973,” The Research Group on Socialism and Democracy Vol. 27 No. 2, P: 84

2 Thomas C. Wright, Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture. Ed. Jay Kinsbruner and Erick D. Langer. Volume1, Second Edition. Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2008. 110

3 Ibid., 110

4 Del Valle Barrera, María, Tomás Koch, and Benigno E. Aguirre. "Commemorating Chile's Coup: The Dynamics of Collective Behavior." Latin American Politics and Society55, no. 2 (2013): 106

Ibid., 109

Ibid., 111

Ibid., 112

5 Thomas C. Wright, Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture. Ed. Jay Kinsbruner and Erick D. Langer. Volume1, Second Edition. Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2008. 110

6 “Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September 1970,” National Security Archive (1970): 4

7 Harold P. Ford, “William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence 1973-1976,” Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington D.C., 1993, 30

8 Kissinger, Henry A., “Meeting with President Emilio Garrastazu Medici of Brazil on Thursday, December 9, 1971, at 10:00am, in the President’s Office, the White House”

9 Kedar, Claudia, “Salvador Allende and the International Monetary Fund, 1970-1973: The Depoliticisation and Technocratisation of Cold War Relations,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (May 2015): 718

Ibid., 724

10 Claudia Kedar, “Salvador Allende and the International Monetary Fund, 1970-1973: The Depoliticisation and Technocratisation of Cold War Relations,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (May 2015): 725

11 Thomas David Clark, “Rethinking Chile’s ‘Chicago Boys’: Neoliberal Technocrats or Revolutionary Vanguard?” Department of Political Science, York University, Toronto, Canada. (December 2, 2016): 1350

12 Ibid., 1351

13 Kissinger, Henry A., “NSC Meeting November 6– Chile, Memorandum for the President, November 5, 1970.”:4

14 Ibid., 2

15 Ibid., 2

16 “Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September 1970,” National Security Archive (1970): 3

17 “Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September 1970,” National Security Archive (1970): 16

18 C.I.A. Activities in Chile, C.I.A. Library, September 18, 2000, 5

19 Ryan, Patrick J., Navy Section-Defense Intelligence Agency, “United States Military Group, Chile Document, October 1, 1973” National Security Council Document, 3

20 C.I.A. Activities in Chile, C.I.A. Library, September 18, 2000, 3

21 Department of State Document, “Briefing Memorandum. November 15, 1973” Declassified National Security Council Document

22 Department of State Document, “Secretary’s Staff Meeting, October 1, 1973.” Declassified National Security Council Document, Declassified August 2, 2002, Cover Page

23 Ibid., 25

24 “Chile: Anatomy of an Economic Miracle, 1970-1986,” Black Flag 216 (1999): 1

Ibid., 2

25 Orlando Letelier, “The 'Chicago Boys' in Chile: Economic Freedom's Awful Toll,” Review of Radical Political Economics (1976): 1

26 Ibid., 1

27 Fernando Muñoz León, “Competing Narratives about Sacrifice: Three Readings of the 11 September 1973 Coup in Chile and their Conflicting Constitutional Projections”, Political Theology, Vol. 17 No. 6 (November 2016): 507

Ibid., 508

Ibid., 511

Ibid., 515

Ibid., 523

28 Manuel Bastías Saavedra. "The Unintended Legacy of September 11, 1973: Transnational Activism and the Human Rights Movement in Latin America." Iberoamericana Vol 13, No. 51 (2013): 87

29 Ibid., 88

30 Ibid., 91

Bibliography :

Primary Sources :

Department of State Document, “Briefing Memorandum. November 15, 1973,” National Security Archive

Department of State Document, “Briefing Memorandum. November 15, 1973,” National Security Archive

Department of State Document, “Secretary’s Staff Meeting, October 1, 1973,” National Security Archive

Kissinger, Henry A., “NSC Meeting November 6– Chile, Memorandum for the President, November 5, 1970,” National Security Archive

Kissinger, Henry A., “Meeting with President Emilio Garrastazu Medici of Brazil on Thursday, December 9, 1971, at 10:00am, in the President’s Office, the White House,” National Security Archive

Memorandum, “Alleged Commitments Made by President Richard M. Nixon to Brazilian President Emilio Garrastazu Medici,” National Security Archive (Undated)

National Security Council Document, “Secretary’s Staff Meeting, October 2, 1973,” National Security Archive

Ryan, Patrick J., Navy Section-Defense Intelligence Agency, “United States Military Group, Chile Document, October 1, 1973,” National Security Archive

“Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September 1970,” National Security Archive (1970)

Orlando Letelier, “The 'Chicago Boys' in Chile: Economic Freedom's Awful Toll,” Review of Radical Political Economics (1976)

Secondary Sources:

Clark, Thomas David, “Rethinking Chile’s ‘Chicago Boys’: Neoliberal Technocrats or Revolutionary Vanguard?” Department of Political Science, York University, Toronto, Canada. (December 2, 2016)

Del Valle Barrera, María, Tomás Koch, and Benigno E. Aguirre. "Commemorating Chile's Coup: The Dynamics of Collective Behavior." Latin American Politics and Society55, no. 2 (2013): 106-32

Ford, Harold P., “William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence 1973-1976,” Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington D.C., 1993

Kedar, Claudia, “Salvador Allende and the International Monetary Fund, 1970-1973: The Depoliticisation and Technocratisation of Cold War Relations,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, May 2015

León, Fernando Muñoz, “Competing Narratives about Sacrifice: Three Readings of the 11 September 1973 Coup in Chile and their Conflicting Constitutional Projections”, Political Theology, Vol. 17 No. 6, November 2016: P. 507-524

Molina, Paula Vidal, “The Notion of Equality in Chile's Communist and Socialist Left, 1960 1973,” The Research Group on Socialism and Democracy Vol. 27 No. 2, : 82-95

Saavedra, Manuel Bastías. "The Unintended Legacy of September 11, 1973: Transnational Activism and the Human Rights Movement in Latin America." Iberoamericana Vol 13, No. 51 (2013): 87-103.

Wright, Thomas C., Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture. Ed. Jay Kinsbruner and Erick D. Langer. Volume1, Second Edition. Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2008. 110

“Chile: Anatomy of an Economic Miracle, 1970-1986,” Black Flag 216 (1999)