Yuriy Boyechko on Russian Drone Warfare and Civilian Terror in Kherson
How are Russian drones and disguised mines endangering civilians in Kherson?
Yuriy Boyechko is a Ukrainian-American humanitarian leader and the founder and CEO of Hope For Ukraine, a U.S.-based nonprofit providing aid to civilians affected by Russia’s war against Ukraine. Under his leadership, the organization delivers medical supplies, evacuation support, and emergency relief to frontline regions, including Kherson. Boyechko works closely with local networks to document evolving threats to civilian life, including drone warfare tactics and urban targeting patterns. He frequently briefs media and policymakers on conditions on the ground, emphasizing both the humanitarian consequences of modern warfare and the urgent need for international attention and support.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen interviews Yuriy Boyechko, founder and CEO of Hope for Ukraine, about Russian drone warfare and remote mining in Kherson. Boyechko describes cloth-wrapped booby traps, “gingerbread” mines, FPV drone attacks, shrinking civilian life, and aid workers operating under constant surveillance. He frames Kherson as a war crime scene where civilians, including children and the elderly, face daily injuries, deaths, displacement, and psychological terror from concealed mines and low-cost drones across the city today.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: You describe a “terrifying new shift” in drone tactics. For context, how have tactics changed since earlier in the year, and what makes this a radical shift?
Yuriy Boyechko: First of all, thanks for having me, Scott, and for discussing this important subject. Our teams have been working in Kherson since the liberation. To set the stage, roughly 60,000 to 70,000 civilians remain there.
Russian forces have been targeting civilians with drones, what locals call a “human safari”, since last year. Starting in March, we began seeing extensive remote mining, with drones dropping small anti-personnel mines. Some are roughly donut-sized and very hard to spot, especially in parks or grass.
Children or other civilians can step on them and be seriously injured or killed. These mines are not aimed at military targets; they pose a direct threat to civilians. In March and April, there were reports of what locals call prianiki, “gingerbread” mines, because of their shape.
More recently, Russian forces have reportedly dropped small booby traps wrapped in cloth or rags. On the road, they can look like pieces of fabric or debris, but local officials and mine specialists describe them as sophisticated explosive devices. Preliminary reports indicate some may be electronically controlled.
When they are dropped, an operator may be positioned across the Dnipro River from Kherson and able to detonate them remotely. This creates a combined threat: drones overhead and concealed explosives underfoot.
Our teams distribute food and humanitarian aid in the city. I spoke to one of our local leaders on Sunday, and she said areas previously considered safe for distribution are no longer safe.
When teams deliver aid to residents living in basements, they may have only a 10- to 15-minute window to get in and out. In addition to watching for drones, they now have to watch every step to avoid concealed mines.
Jacobsen: I mean, from a human rights perspective, is a fundamental issue with this type of mine the fact that it is indiscriminate?
Boyechko: Yes. Kherson is, in many ways, one large war crime scene. The purpose of these tactics is psychological warfare.
They are trying to make the city so dangerous for civilians that the roughly 60,000 people who still live there either leave or are killed. The goal appears to be to empty the city. That has been the broader tactic.
We have been working with human rights activists and the media to bring this to public attention. The individuals responsible should be prosecuted, because these devices affect civilians, older adults and children.
Some reports indicate that earlier “gingerbread” mines (prianiki) were designed to resemble everyday objects. There are claims that they were made to appear harmless, increasing the risk that civilians, including children, might approach them.
This is an extreme form of targeting civilians. It reflects a pattern of attacks that place noncombatants at risk, rather than engaging military targets.
Jacobsen: What was the original population of Kherson, and what is the population now so that people can understand the scale of the decline?
Boyechko: Originally, about 200,000 to 250,000 people lived there. Now, roughly 60,000 remain. There is a part of Kherson called the Korabelnyi district, near the river. That area is essentially a ghost town. During the day, you may not see a single person on the street.
The skies there are dominated by Russian drones. If someone leaves home and tries to walk, the chances of returning safely are very low. The Ukrainian government has tried to install protective nets over some streets to shield civilians, but the area is too large to cover completely.
It is a very difficult situation. Sixty thousand people are still a significant population; people go to work, and children continue schooling, mostly remotely, as in-person classes are limited.
Even basic movement is risky. Before leaving homes or basements, people often open a window to listen for the buzzing sound of drones. If they hear it, they stay inside.
Aid distribution has adapted to these conditions. Our teams often operate under tree cover to avoid detection by drones. They park vehicles beneath large trees to reduce visibility. Now, there is also concern about mines hidden in the grass.
It is a very serious situation. Based on reports from our teams, there are daily civilian casualties, on average, three to five people injured or killed by drones or mines. This does not include larger-scale strikes; it reflects these newer tactics.
Jacobsen: Has the primary target always been civilians, or has there been a noticeable increase in civilian targeting, particularly in Kherson?
Boyechko: With these newer methods, the pattern has intensified. There is a view that Russian forces aim to retake Kherson but cannot do so militarily, so they are attempting to make the city uninhabitable.
This approach has escalated since around October last year. With newer devices, such as cloth-wrapped explosive traps, the methods appear more sophisticated.
There are also claims that some of these incidents are recorded and shared on social media, showing drone operators targeting individuals. These reports require verification, but they have been widely discussed locally.
Efforts are underway to document these actions and identify those responsible. Local awareness of units operating across the river is high. Questions of accountability remain, including when and how those responsible may face legal consequences, and how seriously the international community responds to conditions in Kherson.
Jacobsen: Have these newer versions been deconstructed? If so, where are the components coming from? What are their likely sources?
Boyechko: I do not have a definitive answer to that, especially regarding sourcing. These newer devices, including the cloth-wrapped mines, have only recently been identified.
Based on reports from the ground, they appear to be relatively advanced, as they can be detonated remotely. That suggests more sophisticated components. I cannot confirm their origin, but some observers question whether all such technology is produced domestically in Russia.
Earlier devices, such as the so-called “gingerbread” mines (prianiki), may involve simpler construction. These newer versions appear more complex. The drones used, often FPV drones, also include components widely available on global markets. Some analysts suggest supply chains may include foreign-made parts, though this requires verification.
Jacobsen: Have these new mines increased civilian casualties, or do they mainly represent a more sophisticated threat without a clear rise in casualties?
Boyechko: Civilian casualties appear to have increased significantly, potentially several times higher in the city.
When discussing casualties, we have to consider drones, drone strikes, kamikaze drones, and these mines together. As I mentioned earlier, reports indicate that three to five civilians are injured or killed each day by drones or mines.
Looking back at last year, it wasn't like this. There were missile and artillery strikes, but those occurred less frequently, perhaps once a week or every couple of weeks. Now, the threat is constant and daily.
The only periods of relative safety are during rain or fog, when drone visibility is reduced. Our teams have adapted accordingly. Earlier in the war, after liberation in 2023, access to Kherson was comparatively straightforward. There were risks, but operations were simpler.
Now, delivering aid requires extensive planning, sometimes a week of preparation. The situation changes quickly, so we rely on frequent updates from local authorities, sometimes hourly, about which streets may contain mines. That information helps our teams choose safer routes and reduce risk.
Jacobsen: Do these more sophisticated drones cost more?
Boyechko: No, they are relatively inexpensive. The drones responsible for most of the damage can cost about $500 each. That affordability allows constant surveillance over the city.
Typically, a surveillance drone hovers overhead, and operators then deploy cheaper FPV drones to strike targets. For example, people still use public transport in Kherson when they have to travel. Buses and other vehicles have been targeted with these FPV drones.
As a result, many residents try to wear protective gear, bulletproof vests and helmets, if they can afford them. Even something routine, like getting a haircut, can require that level of precaution.
Elderly residents, or those unable to move easily, often spend most of their time in basements, especially since many windows are boarded up. Kherson has effectively become a war zone, and conditions are extremely dangerous for civilians.
Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Yuriy.
Boyechko: Stay in touch, Scott. All the best, and thank you for covering Ukraine. I appreciate it.
Jacobsen: Thank you. Take care.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a blogger on Vocal with more than 200 publications on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978–1–0692343; 978–1–0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369–6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018–7399; Online: ISSN, 2163–3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719–6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The Good Men Project, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing, comprising more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications across more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20–0708028), and others.
About the Creator
Scott Douglas Jacobsen
Scott Douglas Jacobsen is the publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He is a member in good standing of numerous media organizations.
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