Huawei Let Go. Now AITO Has to Sell Cars on Its Own.

When Huawei's brand endorsement fades: AITO's brand premium revaluation and Seres's independent test

On September 15, 2026, HIMA and AITO Automobile simultaneously released the “Explanation on the AITO Cooperation Model.” A statement of less than 300 words ended rumors from the previous days: the AITO brand's product definition, product design, brand marketing, channel retail, and service system would from then on be led by Seres, with Huawei Terminal providing technology support. HIMA said it would focus resources on Luxeed, Stelato, Maextro, and Shangjie.

This was the largest power-and-responsibility restructuring since the Smart Selection cooperation launched in 2021. Over the past five years, Huawei led products, marketing, channels, and service, while Seres was almost a contract manufacturer. Now the roles have reversed.

The capital market reaction was immediate. That day, Seres A-shares closed down 5.09%, plunged nearly 6% intraday, and H-shares fell more than 6%. More drastic than the stock price was the used-car market: a top-trim AITO M9 with a landing price of about 600,000 yuan, one year old, received a dealer quote of only 220,000 to 235,000 yuan, a one-year residual value of about 38%. Just months earlier, the AITO M9 had ranked first among plug-in hybrids with a one-year value retention rate of 83.14%.

From “value-retention champion” to “dealers won't take any,” only one announcement of a cooperation model adjustment separated them.

I. Power and responsibility restructuring: why Huawei let go

Understanding this adjustment requires distinguishing between the “Smart Selection Car” and “HI Model” cooperation paths. Under the Smart Selection model, Huawei deeply participated in the entire chain of vehicle product definition, styling design, brand communication, store channels, and user operations, while Seres focused on vehicle manufacturing and supply chain management. The HI Model is Huawei providing full-stack smart car solutions, with the automaker leading product definition and sales. After this adjustment, AITO's cooperation model is closer to the latter. Huawei is turning to an asset-light approach, providing technology support rather than full-chain operation.

Huawei's “letting go” has sufficient commercial logic. HIMA already has five brands across five automakers. AITO is the first among the five to prove out a business model. In 2025, AITO's cumulative deliveries exceeded 420,000, accounting for more than 70% of HIMA's five-brand total of 589,000. Huawei chose to return the leadership of a mature brand to its partner and concentrate resources on supporting Luxeed, Stelato, Maextro, and Shangjie. HIMA is moving from “player” to “coach.”

For Seres, the most direct motive for taking back leadership is money. In the first half of 2026, Seres turned from profit to loss, with a net loss attributable to shareholders of 1.717 billion yuan, compared with a profit of 2.941 billion yuan in the same period last year. More glaring is the expense side. In 2025, Seres's selling expenses reached 24.19 billion yuan, of which advertising, image store construction, and service fees accounted for 22.95 billion yuan, or 94.9%, with a selling expense ratio of 14.65%. The absolute amount exceeded SAIC and approached BYD, while revenue was only one-fourth to one-fifth of those two. A considerable portion of this expense flowed to Huawei channels. Seres's Hong Kong IPO prospectus disclosed that from 2022 to the first half of 2025, the company's purchases from its largest supplier totaled about 75 billion yuan, with the proportion of total purchases rising from 14.5% to 33%. The prospectus does not name the supplier. Market consensus points to Huawei.

Taking back leadership means Seres can save this “toll” and operate the brand at its own pace. But saving money does not equal making money. Seres needs to face pricing, marketing, inventory, and after-sales pressure alone without Huawei's deep channel operation and brand endorsement.

II. The return of “AITO Grand Hotel”: warm signal and unresolved anxiety

On the same day as the model adjustment news, AITO User Service's official account announced the return of the “AITO Grand Hotel,” offering free off-peak car washes, free windshield washer fluid, and catering services, covering car care, smart inspection, and roadside assistance.

In December 2025, because excessive traffic caused non-owners to occupy owners' resources, and electricity and meal costs came under pressure, HIMA uniformly halted related promotion, requiring a stop to free catering, car washes, and charging services. Nine months later, these services resumed with fanfare at the node of a fundamental change in brand ownership.

For a brand with an average price above 400,000 yuan, the cost of free car washes and meals is almost negligible compared with the price doubts consumers face. A fine wash at a 75-yuan member price means a 300,000-yuan price gap could cover 4,000 washes. Four-liter washer fluid at 19 yuan means 300,000 yuan could buy 6.3 tons. Service center meals at 20 yuan per person mean 300,000 yuan could cover 15,000 meals. These numbers show a simple point: small favors cannot solve the core anxiety of brand premium.

But the signal of this service upgrade is clear. Seres wants old users to believe that after Huawei exits daily operations, service quality will not decline. This is also a public statement of Seres's transition from the “Huawei channel system” to “independent full-chain operation.” In the Smart Selection 1.0 era, AITO's service system relied on Huawei channels. Under the new model, channels, after-sales, and user experience are all operated independently by Seres. Besides resuming catering and car washes, Seres also offered harder chips: lifetime paint warranty, free service if maintenance runs overtime, and AI cloud smart inspection visual maintenance. Whether these service commitments can be continuously fulfilled depends on Seres's own operating capability and profitability. Against the background of a 1.7 billion yuan loss in the first half, this is a test.

III. Three market impacts: orders, used cars, and brand perception

The market chain reaction triggered by the cooperation model adjustment was more severe than the official statement expected.

Order-side fluctuations appeared first. On the day of the news, many reservation holders canceled, including those who had just begun delivery of the M9 Ultimate Extended Edition. An AITO M6 owner in a service group clearly expressed an intention to return the car, saying that what he valued when buying was “Huawei.” Previously, AITO M9 announced refundable pre-orders exceeding 50,000, and the M6 small-deposit cancellation rate reached 29%. At the point of a fundamental change in brand ownership, conversion of these “refundable orders” faces greater uncertainty.

The used-car market reaction was more severe. The Fuzhou used-car market saw an extreme situation: “No AITO 2024 models accepted at all; for 2025, only M9 top trim accepted.” Taking the market mainstay AITO M7 as an example, the 2025 model's new car guide price was about 249,800 to 329,800 yuan. The one-year-old used-car market price fell to 170,000 to 220,000 yuan, a depreciation of about 28% to 32%. Jielanlu data shows that in June 2026, AITO's brand value retention rate fell from May's 81.3% to 76.5%, a drop of 4.8 percentage points, the largest decline among monitored brands. The June decline was mainly affected by M8 terminal promotions and did not yet include the impact of the September cooperation model adjustment. The September adjustment will add to that decline.

The impact on brand perception is the most profound. In past years, AITO was able to quickly enter the high-end market and build a price premium, with its core relying on consumer trust in “Huawei's work.” However, Huawei's intelligent driving technology and cockpit systems are opening up to more brands. The Yijing brand X9, co-created by Dongfeng and Huawei Qiankun, carries the same Huawei Qiankun ADS 5 intelligent driving system and 896-line lidar as the AITO M9, with a pre-sale price of only 299,800 to 379,800 yuan, 100,000 to 180,000 yuan lower than the AITO M9's 479,800 starting price. If strictly comparing six-seat models, the AITO M9 six-seat version starts at 489,800 yuan, a price gap with the Yijing X9 of nearly 190,000 yuan.

When “Huawei intelligent driving” is no longer an exclusive label for models above 300,000 yuan, AITO needs to answer a question it has never faced: after stripping away “Huawei deep operation” as a differentiator, what remains of its brand premium?

IV. Seres's challenges: sales, channels, and brand independence

Sales data reveals the severe reality. In August 2026, Seres's new energy vehicle sales were 24,244, down 43.96% year-on-year. Of that, “Seres Automobile,” responsible for AITO series sales, sold 20,652, down 49.68% year-on-year. The July situation was equally grim: AITO series sales were 20,480, a year-on-year decline of 50.86%, while a year earlier AITO monthly sales were still above 40,000. From Q1 year-on-year growth of 43.90% to August year-on-year decline of 43.96%, only seven months passed.

On channels: as of the end of 2025, Seres had 380 user centers in operation, covering 218 cities and achieving 100% coverage in third-tier and above cities. But Seres stores are highly dependent on Huawei's offline retail network. Huawei has more than 50,000 stores nationwide, of which about 1,000 can display and sell AITO models. Under the “exclusive dedicated” new model, some former HIMA stores will be transferred to Seres's operation, but this also means Seres must bear the operating costs and expansion pressure of these stores alone. In third-tier and below cities, Seres stores are noticeably fewer than those of BYD, Li Auto, and others. Some cities rely only on Huawei authorized stores for display, lacking independent delivery and after-sales service capability.

Public opinion pressure is also part of the problem. Previously, under Huawei's protection, AITO's public opinion environment was relatively controllable. Now, losing Huawei's deep participation, Seres must face a more complex public opinion landscape alone. After the cooperation model adjustment, a large group of Huawei fans joined the ranks of those ready to mock Seres.

Conclusion: the path to brand independence

This power-and-responsibility restructuring between Huawei and Seres is short-term negative for both. Huawei lost a brand operation sample already proven out, and Seres lost its core brand endorsement. In the long term, this is the kind of step China's smart electric vehicle industry needs to mature. An automaker cannot forever rely on a technology supplier's brand endorsement to sell cars.

Whether Seres can withstand the current brutal competition in the auto industry depends on three key variables: whether it can create differentiated value independent of Huawei in product definition, whether it can build service capability in channel operations not inferior to the Huawei era, and whether it can make consumers believe in brand communication that “AITO” itself is worth that price.

AITO M9's user base and channel system, having been the top seller in large SUVs above 500,000 yuan for 21 consecutive months, still remain. But facing price cuts from competitors like the Yijing X9, and the reality of its own sales hovering at a low platform of 24,000 vehicles for two consecutive months, the time window left for Seres to prove itself is narrowing.

The return of the “AITO Grand Hotel” is a goodwill signal. The reason consumers ultimately pay is never free car washes and cafeteria meals, but whether the car itself is worth the price. When “Huawei's work” no longer holds as a reason, Seres needs to provide a persuasive answer.