200,000 recruits train for a week to go to war, US media mocks

Recently, Russia has launched a full-scale local mobilization in the country, and it is doing its best to eliminate the Ukrainian fascists.

However, the U.S. media is dismissive of Russia's local mobilization. The U.S. media said that only a week after Putin ordered the mobilization, Russian recruits are on the front line, which is to let Russian recruits with rifles be cannon fodder. The relevant intelligence shows that the Russian army recruits have already taken up their rifles and gone to the front line after just one week of training, so you can imagine that the training of these recruits is extremely hasty. The U.S. media is tantamount to criticizing the Russian army for not being responsible for the recruits.

Is it a rumor that the U.S. media is so critical? If the U.S. media said so unilaterally, it would indeed be a rumor. But the U.S. media's claim was proven by the Russian recruits involved, some Russian recruits said the military did not send them enough equipment, such as battlefield body armor, life-saving equipment, and other protective items that had to be purchased by their personnel. Russian troops on the front line have trouble securing even the most basic food and water, and Russian logistics do not give soldiers enough battlefield essentials. This means that Russian recruits will be hungry and armed with rifles to face Ukrainian troops who have a lot of Western heavy weapons and are fully mobilized for the battlefield.

Russian civil society groups also doubt the combat effectiveness of the newly formed troops, and one Russian civil society group says that these soldiers are rushed into battle without even the most basic medical examinations and that the Russian army has only one week from the time they are recruited to the front line. This week, the most basic military skills can not be guaranteed, probably these soldiers did not even learn to shoot before leaving.

There is another set of figures that are even more alarming about the "water" of the Russian army's recruitment: the Russian army claims to have recruited 300,000 reservists, but the actual number of reservists recruited by the Russian army is only tens of thousands, of which less than 9,000 are in the Central Military District. It is clear from the above list of facts that there is a very serious problem of defense mobilization in Russia. This matter allows us to make the following analysis.

First, the Russian army mobilized 200,000 civilians to train for a week to go to war, is indeed forced to do so, and the cause of the lack of professional reserve forces in Russia, can only mobilize civilians to go to war is the last leader of the Soviet era, Go and former Russian defense minister Sverdlovsk.

After becoming the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, he was deceived by the United States into signing the INF treaty and destroying his country's intermediate-range missiles. By 1987, Gore had carried out another major purge of the Soviet military, which led to a serious deterioration in relations between the Soviet military and Gore and eventually made the Soviet military no longer trust the authorities.

In 1991, Gore announced his resignation as the leader of the Soviet Union, dismantling the mighty Soviet Union himself like a shirker. In the absence of the Soviet Union, Russia's military industry and military construction fell into disarray. The Soviet army was able to produce thousands of tanks a year, but with the Soviet Union gone, Russia could only produce a few dozen tanks a year. Due to the restrictions of the INF treaty, the Russian military is short of many types of medium-range missiles. As a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union by the Soviets leading to extreme economic hardship after Russia's independence, the Russian reserve force construction and defense mobilization system came to a standstill. In the Chechen war, the Russian army then sent recruits directly to the battlefield, ushering in the lambasting of Russian Dumas deputies.

When Putin came to power, he wanted to reform the army's ills, but Sverdlovsk, whom Putin reappointed, took the wrong approach to reform and simply disbanded the Russian army's only reserve combat units altogether. This added to the woes of the Russian reserve forces that had been tossed by Go. Even if Shogun wanted to restore the mobilization capacity of the Russian reserve forces, it would be very difficult.

And it is the misguided reforms of Gore and Sverdlovsk that have left the Russian army in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict today with very few reserve units to mobilize for battle. To fill the gap of the shortage of soldiers, the Russian local states and counties can only adopt the method of compulsory conscription, allowing civilians who have not received any military training to go directly to the battlefield after a week of training in the barracks, as for the protective materials and various supplies for the battlefield, they can only let the Russian recruits buy them themselves. The logistics could not provide for the Russian army's meals and water. The ill effects of Goa Baryshnikov's military reform of the Russian army finally manifested themselves in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

Second, the Russian army mobilized recruits to the battlefield, which may bring more negative effects on the Russian army.

Originally, the Russian public supported the special military operation, and the public hoped that more than 200,000 Russian troops could quickly destroy the fascist authorities in Ukraine. Even if the troops are not enough, the Russian people hope that their reservists will take up the mantle and fight the war for their country.

However, the mobilization of the Russian army was a big disappointment to the Russian public. Among the 300,000 mobilized soldiers of the Russian army, there are only a few tens of thousands of reservists, and the remaining 200,000 soldiers are people who have not undergone any military training. Nowadays, the military is more technology-intensive than manpower-intensive in high-tech wars, and the past wars that were won by the sea of men are long gone.

When the time comes, even if the Russian army enlists more recruits, these recruits without specialized military training will not be able to turn the current situation around.

Third, the Russian defense mobilization of more than 200,000 recruits lesson tells the world that must be formed in the formation of a lean standing army at the same time, formation of a large number of people, and a strong defense reserve force with scientific and technological content. The training and readiness of the reserve forces must be done in the usual way, and the equipment training of the reserve forces and the active duty forces should be synchronized. For example, in the United States, there are 8 divisions and 21 brigades in the U.S. Army Reserve, with a total strength of 1 million troops, 10,000 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, more than 6,300 artillery pieces and rocket launchers, and more than 3,000 helicopters. The command structure of these reserve units is all active duty, and the soldiers are retired soldiers with annual specialized military training.

Once needed, the reserve divisions can be transferred to active duty at any time to take their equipment to the front. Russia, on the other hand, does not have an established reserve division, and can only take recruits to fill the number, and there are no tanks, artillery, or aircraft to supplement the reserve forces. The Russian reserve construction and defense mobilization system need to be improved.