American Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was somewhat of an outlier at that juncture in history. As he guided the U.S. into World War I, he faced significant skepticism from the political elite. For many years, the U.S. had successfully adhered to the Monroe Doctrine, essentially telling Europeans to remain distant from the Americas, but America would stay home, too. Through gradual expansion, reaching as far as the Pacific, the nation evolved into the world's powerhouse — a development that went largely unnoticed as European powers were preoccupied with themselves. Yet, unexpectedly, American troops surfaced in the Flemish trenches, assuming a pivotal role.

Isolationists strike back

The Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles — which outlined the terms for peace with Germany and established the League of Nations — underscored the enduring supremacy of isolationist policies. Following Wilson, the nation saw a succession of presidents rejecting U.S. engagement abroad — Harding and Coolidge, both Republicans with isolationist tendencies. Hoover, another Republican, was more undecided before Franklin D. Roosevelt, a Democrat, steered the superpower into World War II.

The Pearl Harbor Shockwave

The Pearl Harbor attack shattered the American sense of invulnerability, fostered by geographical barriers – two Oceans – and friendly neighbors. However, the aggressive exploits of Germany, Italy, and Japan had already eroded the post-World War stability through forceful expansion. The world witnessed Germany violating Eastern Europe in pursuit of Lebensraum, Italy's assaults on Abyssinia and the Balkans, and Japan establishing a colonial presence in Chinese Manchuria. This era saw Wilson's vision of collective security, with the League of Nations as protector of world peace, reduced to a mockery. Realpolitik took precedence globally. Collective security remained an excellent idea distinct from reality. The world was governed more by self-interest than by shared values.

Misperception and Misunderstandings

From the American perspective, Communism emerged as the preeminent threat. The Soviet Union developed expansionist tendencies, utilizing the Communist International as a tool of its global foreign policy, with its ideology finding followers among many. Bolshevik-style revolution almost happened in postwar Germany; in Hungary, the communists organized an intermezzo in power – just to be overthrown by a right-wing authoritarian regime under Counter-Admiral Horthy.

"(…) officials in the Coolidge, Hoover, and Roosevelt administrations viewed the world through ideological blinders, which distorted their perceptions of political developments in Central America and the Mediterranean Basin in highly predictable ways " (Little 1983: 377)

The U.S. reacted to the threat by supporting filthy regimes, or at least by not intervening when democracy was threatened. In the slipstream of American absence, Mussolini marched to Rome, Franco took Madrid, and Hitler took Berlin. France and Great Britain, exhausted from the Great War, weren't able to uphold the post-war peace order. Wilson's flagship, collective security, failed to pop in during numerous crises. Militarily, the U.S. intervened in the Americas only, for instance, against Sandino in Nicaragua.

Internal Constraints

Domestically, the Great Depression exacerbated the nation's isolationist impulses. The New Deal, while pivotal, consumed substantial resources, relegating foreign policy endeavors to the background. This period saw the ascendency of protectionism, contradictory to America's traditional advocacy for open markets. How should we call that? Neo-mercantilism? Both politically and economically, the time did not seem to be ripe for getting engaged globally.

Disturbances in the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific narrative was one mirroring the complexities in Europe. Japanese expansion reached Korea and China with brutal force, clashing with established powers, including France, Great Britain, and Russia. The U.S. initiated dialogues addressing the Japanese threat, yet actions beyond declarations were scant. Ignoring Japan was no longer viable, prompting a strategy shift towards containment as voiced by F.D. Roosevelt in his 1937 "Quarantine Speech," advocating for economic sanctions against hostile nations.

"Those who cherish their freedom and recognize and respect the equal right of their neighbors to be free and live in peace, must work together for the triumph of law and moral principles in order that peace, justice and confidence may prevail in the world." (Rosevelt, Quarantine Speech 1937)

Despite vehement criticism from isolationists, Roosevelt initiated an oil embargo on Japan in 1941 and executed it via the Phillipines. This move critically affected Tokyo's naval capabilities, leading to the tragic Pearl Harbor event.

The Isolationist Superpower: A Paradox?

An isolationist superpower seems almost an oxymoron. During the interwar period, economically, the U.S. became the world's hegemon, but American foreign policy did not live up to the role the structure of the international system dedicated to Washington. During the previous interventionist phase under Woodrow Wilson, getting engaged in European affairs was much more a one-man show than in the build-up of the Second World War. In 1919, Wilson, an agent of collective security and intervention, was not backed by the political elite. making the U.S. act accordingly to its hegemonic position. But that changed over time, and Roosevelt was the executor, closing the gap between power and engagement. America learned the lesson of the interwar period and stayed in the game after 1945: in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East. Isolationist protagonists in the Republican Party maybe should read some history books.