How Inferior Training is Killing Russian Pilots

The combat force must function as one coherent entity. To start, you need well-trained soldiers with the proper gear, who are supplied by equally well-trained officers and under their command. You also need strong support elements like tanks, armored battle vehicles, and Javelin air defense missiles to protect your troops from enemy air forces and helicopters. bigger surface-to-air systems, such as the S-300 and 400 from Russia or the better Patriot from the United States, to increase the anti-air reach even more. Additionally, you need to do thorough Be aware of your opponent's location, physical attributes, and motivations.

These days, having a solid team of drones and drone operators is necessary for such recon work. To weaken heavily fortified locations, disperse any advancing formations, and engage opposing artillery with counter-battery fire, you also need a powerful and well-coordinated artillery arm. However, the air force of any contemporary combined force may be its most crucial component. The most adaptable component of any is here.

combined military power: they may obstruct transportation, assault supplies, and artillery positions, drop smart bombs or long-range missiles, disable enemy radar systems with HARM missiles, and more. Complete time-sensitive recon missions, but more critically, strike at potential targets that your artillery can't reach. Russian air power dominance is ineffective.

The conflict over Ukraine is one of the main factors in Putin's poorly planned and advised invasion's failure. Russian rotary and fixed-wing aircraft have been downed in startlingly large numbers during the first few weeks of the conflict. The Russian air force, also known as the VKS (Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily), is compelled by this to avoid the front lines.

usually have to launch any rockets or glide bombs they employ (referred to as the "Air and Space Branches"). from the security of Belarusian or Russian airspace. They have not been able to offer. Since the beginning of the war, they haven't provided close air support and couldn't stop Ukraine from using drones for long-range attacks. such as the powerful Storm Shadow missiles. Analysts who believed the significantly more powerful VKS would build not just a ground presence but also an air presence have been extremely surprised by the lack of one. not only virtual air supremacy over the entire conflict but also air superiority over the nation of Ukraine.

allowing total reign over the sky for them. Nevertheless, Putin and his generals have found it difficult to accept the facts. Russia has lost more than 400 fixed-wing and rotary (helicopter) aircraft, which is more than twice as many as the Ukrainian air force has reported losses in, according to Oryx, a Dutch-based open-source intelligence defense analysis website. Russian losses allegedly total over 600 fighter and attack helicopters, according to Ukrainian military sources. But why is the Russian air force performing so poorly? Are they flying certain aircraft? That

Using the MiG-29 Fulcrum and Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker as an example, Ukraine has been operating nearly identical Soviet-era aircraft. The Su-35, which has been compared to the US F-35 in terms of capabilities, is one of Russia's more capable flying more modern aircraft. Su-35s have gradually taken the place of older Soviet aircraft for the VKS, yet even these cutting-edge planes are getting shot down. The significant issue with the VKS's substantial losses

It is not limited to the vessel itself; they have a few thousand more at their disposal. Pilots with experience are more difficult to replace. Good pilots are practically unreplaceable. As most air forces have discovered, younger pilots will greatly benefit from their knowledge. from the US method of rotating experienced pilots back home during World War II, when they would impart their profound understanding of air combat to less experienced pilots. Russia's capacity to develop new pilots has been significantly hampered by the loss of these seasoned airmen.

It results in less skilled and trained pilots who ultimately don't last as long. This turns into a destructive cycle that reinforces itself. When their pilots were expected to continue flying until they were shot down during World War II, Japan experienced that issue personally. As a result, their replacements had a significant training gap and were increasingly easily shot down by the more experienced US pilots they were up against. The main cause of the high number of losses in Russia's air war may be due to the lack of pilot training. But why exactly is Russia sending relatively novice pilots into battle in the first place, and what can Russia do to change the situation? US and Western Fighters vs. Soviet and Russian Fighters in History The Soviet air force faced off against a superior force that was qualitatively more equipped, more experienced, and, at least in the early going, better-supplied German aviation force by the end of the war. Many of the Luftwaffe's combat-experienced pilots, who fought in the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939, were on board at the start of the conflict.

later engaged in combat with the Royal Air Force of Great Britain in the Western campaign of 1940 that overthrew the French government. The Soviet air force, meanwhile, lacked sufficient aircraft, support personnel, and air bases from which to deploy its expanding air fleet early in the conflict. Stalin had to make do with what he had to keep the Germans at bay while Further east, his industrial base made a comeback. They used American-made machinery to good effect. better-supplied German aviation force by the end of the war. Many of the Luftwaffe's combat-experienced pilots, who fought in the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939, were on board at the start of the conflict.

later engaged in combat with the Royal Air Force of Great Britain in the Western campaign of 1940 that overthrew the French government. The Soviet air force, meanwhile, lacked sufficient aircraft, support personnel, and air bases from which to deploy its expanding air fleet early in the conflict. Stalin had to make do with what he had to keep the Germans at bay while

Further east, his industrial base made a comeback. They used American-made machinery to good effect. P-40 Warhawks were among the almost 15,000 aircraft the US provided to the Soviet Union as part of the Lend-Lease agreement. Before the start of the Cold War, the US possessed a sizable numerical and quality aircraft superiority over the Soviet Union. However, US pilots realized that the smaller Migs they fought were nimble and agile dogfighters, which came as a harsh surprise to them during action against Soviet aircraft during the Korean War. The US soon recovered from those early setbacks, and by the 1970s, it was regarded as possessing the world's best air force. But it was at that point that US intentions started to diverge from the Soviet belief system. The first difference was in how it was used: Soviet leaders never anticipated having fleets of fighters scouring the sky for adversarial aircraft. To pursue their more lucrative

surface-to-air missile batteries that are both numerous and affordable. SAM batteries severely damaged the US. During battles in the first Gulf War in the 1990s, airplanes posed a serious threat, just as they had done in the Vietnam War. More significantly, the Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia, saw their air force as an additional part of their artillery.

As they were intended to deliver long-range strikes against a wide spectrum of ground targets in addition to close air assistance. They constructed an air force, and the aircraft that pilots flew, to be tough, robust, and numerous, much like how they deployed large quantities of artillery to crush any opponent. The expectation was that the Soviet air force would far outnumber the opposition. With their enormous superiority in tanks and artillery, they envisaged conquering NATO nations. At the height of the Cold War in the 1970s, the Soviet Union had an advantage in numbers, but some of its fighters were also superior in other ways. For example, they were more durable and could be repaired with just an ordinary welder's tools.

Many of their fighters featured more enormous engines, which often gave their aircraft greater thrust-to-weight ratios than their Western equivalents. - Although they possessed higher aerodynamic qualities in many of their fighter aircraft, this was frequently compensated by the lack of advanced welds. At lower altitudes, the Soviet fighters were more agile due to their higher thrust-to-weight ratio. - The helmet was first used in the USSR.

Late adopters of the mounted cueing system (HMCS) were the US and other Western aviation forces. All of these specifics seemed to provide the Soviet Union with a qualitative advantage in addition to its numerical advantage. However, the US and NATO also made advancements during this time: - The West improved electronic warfare (EW) systems and developed sophisticated radar jamming techniques. To guide them, they depended heavily on weapons that could fire beyond visual range (BVR) and more potent onboard radar. - To counter adversary radar, the US created superior stealth technology. - The US also created AWACS that were superior. aircraft with (airborne warning and control systems). The US and NATO also developed much-improved coordination and strength of close air support. Using an alternative notion of air power, you could defeat your adversary before they could approach within range. To counterattack, the US and NATO devised a strategy that would allow them to outfly any Soviet or Russian aircraft before they could use their numerical advantage.

It should be noted that the Soviet Union and later the Russians did eventually develop their own BVR missiles and other cutting-edge capabilities, but their designs weren't as reliable or as sophisticated as their Western counterparts and were more susceptible to jamming and electronic interference. In addition, targeting pods and precision-guided weapons were late in coming to the Soviet and Russian air forces, which lagged behind other Western technological advancements.

And during the past ten years, Western sanctions have made it more challenging for Russia to produce cutting-edge aircraft and other components that require high-quality computer chips and other restricted goods.

Everything depends on the passenger on the seat Despite these qualitative and quantitative discrepancies, the Russian air force was still regarded as the second-best air force in the world, trailing only the US Air Force and the air forces of the US Navy and US Marines. However, the most crucial element—trained and experienced pilots—was still missing. even though the West and the US had an opportunity to benefit While assisting Syrian tyrant Bashar al-Assad in 2015 to crush opposition groups in his nation, the Russians had only a little shooting war expertise from their participation in the two Gulf Wars. However, their operations have little in common with the dangerous fighting zone above Ukraine. The Man in the Seat Is What Matters Most The Russian air force was nevertheless regarded as the best in the world, second only to the US Air Force and ahead of the air forces of the US Navy and US Marines, despite these qualitative and quantitative discrepancies. They lacked skilled and experienced pilots, though, which is the most crucial element.

While there was potential for growth for the West and the US When the Russians began assisting Syrian tyrant Bashar al-Assad in 2015 to crush opposition groups in his nation, they had little combat experience aside from two Gulf Wars. The lethal war zone above Ukraine is nothing like those missions, though. First off, Russia never stationed more than a few thousand soldiers and a few aircraft in Syria at any given time. As a result, Putin was able to alternate his best troops and units in and out, shielding them from the brutality of a protracted struggle like the one in Ukraine. Additionally, in Syria, the Russian troops were battling insurgents with limited equipment.

Unlike the Ukrainian army's NATO-equipped counterpart. For instance, the US alone provided Ukraine with nearly 17,000 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) in the early weeks of the conflict. notably the powerful Stinger missile, which has wreaked havoc on low-flying helicopters and airplanes from Russia. Third, whereas Ukraine is covered in woods, most of the Syrian desert regions where Russian airstrikes took place in Syria had scattered cities. It is harder to spot a potential threat because of the hills and river valleys. The Russian air force has paid a heavy price for this dearth of practical combat training. There has Having lost between 300 and 500 of their greatest front-line pilots, they have been progressively learning that information. Some of those pilots were instructors at VKS training units who were sent into battle to make up for the attrition in their units, thus their experience cannot be recreated.

have endured. As a result of the large number of Russian instructors working in Belarusian aviation schools, reports claim that Russia has sent many of its inexperienced pilots there to be trained. Russian Training against US and NATO Training: A Comparison We return to training once more, or more particularly, the dearth of Russian pilot instruction. General Mick, a retired US Army officer According to West, takes into account the following "seven considerations: purpose, design, timing, location, resources, adaptation, and politics" before taking any offensive action. These all remain relevant. The eighth is now included: training. The Russians have never placed more emphasis on training similar to how the West has viewed its wish list. The wildly dissimilar budgets have played a role in it.

Approximately $877 billion, or 3.8% of the annual budget, is spent on defense in the United States.

Russian spending is just $87.9 billion, compared to the country's overall GDP. Even that figure isn't entirely indicative, though. The Russian military is, and up to 40% of Russians are believed to be corrupt, with senior officials embezzling money from everything, including munitions stockpiles, fuel reserves, equipment maintenance, and yes, training. That is how people can afford mansions that cost $18 million (in 2015 dollars) and how many people, like Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, can. The ability to purchase a mega-yacht and enroll their kids in opulent Turkish or European schools is increasing.

That large-scale kleptocracy in Russia has hurt every aspect of the military, including pilot training. The time and money required to place inexperienced pilots in their seats and let them practice flying their aircraft are too expensive for Russia's air force to pay. NATO, however

The expectation across the globe is for pilots to complete 150–200 hours of flying training annually. Russian pilots, on the other hand, are lucky to receive between 70 and 120 hours a year, or even half that. Flight hours for bomber crews are based on VKS confessions that there is much less than the 150-hour threshold regarded as the minimum for satisfactory performance in NATO air fleets. The situation for fighter and multirole groups isn't much better.

with some units receiving praise for achieving an annual average of just 70 flight hours. In contrast, it is predicted that a US pilot will log at least 130 hours of flight time. but will spend closer to 230 hours a year doing so. Additionally, there is Russia just does not place the same emphasis on advanced simulator training as the US does. have a sufficient number of. On average, a Russian fighter pilot who has been with his unit for at least four years will likely have gathered more experience than a US pilot.480 just in total

the same four-year period for American pilots will result in 920 total flight hours. nearly twice as many flight hours as their Russian rivals, who lack such experience. The US also conducts Red Flag, a significant air warfare exercise that compels a range of aircraft to cooperate and is known as its famed adversary school internationally. versus aggressive aircraft and pilots trained particularly to mimic real-world situations against the actions and strategies of opponent nations. Every year, US allies from all around the world send pilots, aircraft, and ground support teams to Red Flag.

This aims to expand the scope and authenticity of this combat training environment. According to the US Air Force, it is not uncommon for more than 30 distinct types of aircraft, as well as a vast list of ground-based assets, to engage in any single Red Flag exercise. defense systems, and other dangers that are likely to be encountered in real-world combat circumstances. Russian pilots had no combat experience, let alone flying over a wide, forested region against an opponent capable of hitting their jets with layers of air defenses. They received little to no training in such techniques before the invasion, as no one save Putin's closest circle did. Circle was even aware of plans for a full-scale invasion. Because of their inexperience and lack of training, Russia has been unable to annihilate or suppress Ukraine's air force, despite flying hundreds of missions each day early in the war. Meanwhile, in preparation for Operation Desert Storm in 1990, US pilots who intended to participate in the operation be tasked with eliminating Iraqi air defenses that had been trained for months to perform such strikes, even though they were not notified of their exact targets until just a few days before the attack, to maintain operational security (OpSec) surrounding the mission. They understood from the start what their mission would be, what routes they'd be flying, and who their opponents would most likely be.

Putin, with his vast military expertise, decided that his air force will not require any of that nonsense training or preparedness. Many soldiers and Officers were taken aback when they got instructions to attack Ukraine. Because of the lack of preparedness, Russian pilots had little time to prepare for the heavy air defense that Ukrainian troops were able to mount against them. Another element contributing to the VKS's ineffectiveness was Russia's use of its limited air force assets.

One of the Su-27s probably hit the drone while pouring gasoline on it to drive it down.

You're flying too near to it. Was this a deliberate collision or a result of bad training?

Other incidents involving poor training have resulted in the loss of planes, ranging from fighters dropping all of their decoy flares too soon, allowing them to be hit by a patient MANPADS operator to inexperienced pilots failing to account for turbulence and crashing during a two-fighter take-off. In early May 2023, two fighters and a pair of assault helicopters were shot down by their air defense systems, probably due to the pilots failing to coordinate enough with their local radar operators. Regardless of how sad these losses have been, the VKS has learned its lessons. Although its pilots were unable to neutralize Ukraine's air defenses, it must be remembered that such operations are not uncommon.

are notoriously time-consuming and difficult, as US pilots discovered in both the Gulf Wars and previous battles. The VKS is also learning this lesson. Rather than continue to lose pilots and aircraft by flying more conservative and ineffective missions, it is attempting to wear down Ukrainian air defenses by utilizing decoys such as empty Soviet-era missiles and Shaheed drones obtained from Iran. Analysts have speculated that Ukraine may be running out of the missiles and MANPADS required to block the VKS from flying over Ukraine. Indeed, one of the confidential documents disclosed earlier this year during the Discord leaks, dated 23 February and labeled "Secret," details in detail how Ukraine's Soviet-era

At the present pace of use, S-300 air defense systems could be depleted by the first weeks of May. However, because Ukraine has continued to defend itself for more than a month past the anticipated date, We believe Ukraine has received more than enough missiles to protect itself. They've also received new anti-air systems, such as the German Geppard, which is useful against drones like the Iranian Shaheed, as well as the US-built Patriot Pac 2 systems. which are said to be capable of shooting down Russia's thought-to-be-invincible hypersonic Kinzha missile. This is terrible news for Russia and its pilots. As Ukraine acquires additional NATO air defense equipment, the estimated 65 to 75 Russian pilots who graduate each year face a bleak future.

Russia's losses in the conflict in Ukraine's ability to replace those valuable pilots greatly outstrips Russia's. As the summer progresses and Ukraine launches its long-awaited counter-offensive, it is evident that Russia's renowned VKS will be unable to back its ground forces. The most they can do is launch more futile missile attacks against Ukrainian citizens from deep within Russian airspace. By the end of the year, when the West begins to supply new fighter aircraft to Ukraine, including the updated F-16 with its Mid-Life Update (MLU), Russia's air force may have to give air space over its borders. And as Russia's losses increase, and Putin

As more novice and untrained pilots are rushed into frontline action, the overall quality of the VKS will deteriorate. This degeneration could take a decade or more to overcome. We can only hope that the Kremlin is occupied by someone more stable.

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