The Rope Was Pulled Before the Third Step

The release rope was pulled.

The sliding carriage had just been pushed off the platform. The visitor's feet had not yet left the platform edge. The operating procedure required the structure to slide about 10 meters along the guide rail, until it reached directly beneath the point where the top support bar connects to the steel cable, away from the rock face. Only there was the rope supposed to be pulled. Ten meters is roughly twelve steps for an adult. The rope was pulled before the third step.

The quick-release device opened. The daisy chain separated from the quick-release device. The person fell. Directly below was a protruding rock face.

Later, the head of the Huaying City Emergency Management Bureau described the normal procedure to reporters using the term "safe position." He said that after the visitor put on the equipment at the operating platform, the pulley structure slid to the safe position, then the release switch was opened, and the visitor swung out on the swing rope. The so-called safe position is about 10 meters from the operating platform.

The accident report's direct cause states: the operator failed to strictly follow the operating procedure and failed to correctly operate the release rope, causing the release mechanism of the quick-release device to open prematurely before the sliding carriage had reached the normal release position.

The report does not say: between this "normal release position" and "premature opening" there was no physical interlock of any kind. No mechanical structure ensured that "before 10 meters, the release device could not physically open." The only thing preventing premature release was the operator's judgment of timing. And this person, in the Huaying City Emergency Management Bureau's own words, could not produce anything on education and training. The training was "on-site demonstration" and "some training on tying ropes."

There was no surveillance at the scene.

The operator involved was Chongqing Adventure Camp Outdoor Development Co., Ltd. On its Qichacha page, registered capital is 500,000 yuan, paid-in capital 10,000 yuan. On May 6, 2026, the third day after the accident, the company was listed in the abnormal operations directory by the Shapingba District Market Supervision Administration of Chongqing for being "unreachable at its registered domicile or business premises."

The project opened in April. The accident occurred on May 3. It had operated for 49 days. Tickets were 398 yuan, with insurance charged separately at 15 yuan.

The company relied on a 30-page inspection report issued in January of this year. The report measured steel pipe dimensions and structural load-bearing capacity. It said nothing about fall prevention in the event of operator error or emergency rescue.

In April, a user commented under the scenic area's official account: "I'm scared I'll croak." Customer service replied with three characters: "Guaranteed alive."

On May 3, a 16-year-old girl fell while experiencing the project, struck the waterfall rock face, and died after emergency rescue failed.

On March 1, 2025, the mandatory national standard Safety Technical Requirements for Cliff Swings took effect. The standard requires that cliff swings "be equipped with a safety device between the passenger-carrying device and the crossbeam to prevent failure of the suspension structure," and that rescue measures be in place to prevent abnormal separation devices from causing people to be stranded at height. In November 2023, the State Administration for Market Regulation had already included cliff swings in the category of large-scale amusement rides under special equipment for regulation.

The "Big Swing" was classified as a "flying trapeze series" project. It swapped in a soft rope and changed its name. Over 49 days, prior approval and routine inspections by local culture and tourism authorities and market regulators did not stop it.

The investigation report's wording is: "The territorial government and regulatory departments failed to adequately perform safety oversight, and there were loopholes in supervision and inspection." The investigation found problems with how public officials performed their duties. Those have been transferred to disciplinary inspection and supervision organs for accountability.

Two people directly responsible for the accident have been transferred to judicial organs. This corresponds to the crime of major responsibility accident under Article 134 of the Criminal Law. For causing one death, the statutory baseline penalty is fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention.

Article 1176 of the Civil Code provides that where a person voluntarily participates in a cultural or sports activity with a certain risk and is harmed by the conduct of another participant, the victim may not request the other participant to bear tort liability. Article 1198 provides that where the operator or manager of a business premises or public place fails to fulfill safety guarantee obligations and thereby causes harm to another person, it shall bear tort liability. A 16-year-old girl bought a ticket. She agreed to "the feeling of weightlessness when swinging out." She did not agree to "the operator may pull the rope early and make me hit the rock face." The operator used untrained staff. It lacked a physical safety interlock. It installed no surveillance. It failed to identify and control safety risks. The assumption-of-risk exemption does not apply.

On the Qichacha page, the status field for Chongqing Adventure Camp Outdoor Development Co., Ltd. reads "Abnormal Operations." Date listed: May 6, 2026. Date of accident: May 3, 2026.