The $14 Billion Arms Sale Trump Won’t Sign — And the Quiet Message to Taiwan

US$14 Billion on the Table

On September 21, 2026, The New York Times reported that Ryan Hass, a former China director at the U.S. National Security Council, said some Taiwanese officials visiting the United States had been asked by Trump administration officials to reduce their visits to think tanks in Washington.

That same day, another story resurfaced. A US$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, approved by Congress in January, still had not been signed.

Put the two developments together and a pattern starts to emerge. Taiwan is being asked to keep a lower profile inside Washington's policy circles.

1. Congress approved the sale. The president did not sign it.

The package includes Patriot PAC-3 air-defense missiles, NASAMS surface-to-air missile systems and counter-drone systems. Both chambers of Congress approved it in January. Under the normal process, the president's signature would allow the sale to move forward.

Trump did not sign it.

In May, acting Navy Secretary Gao Xiong told a Senate hearing that the administration was "pausing" the sale to make sure U.S. ammunition stocks were sufficient for Operation Epic Fury.

Taiwanese researcher Chieh Chung at Tamkang University has questioned that explanation. The arms package was reported by foreign media in early February, which suggests the administration had already completed an informal briefing in mid-January and planned to send a draft offer to Congress before the end of February. The decision to halt the sale therefore appears to have come before Operation Epic Fury even began.

Trump's own comments matter more than the timeline.

Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One after returning from Beijing, Trump said he had discussed the arms sale with Xi Jinping and described it as "a very good bargaining chip."

In an interview with Fox News, he was even more explicit: "No, I'm holding that up. It depends on China." He added, "I may approve it, or I may not."

Since Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, U.S. presidents have differed in the timing and scale of arms sales to Taiwan. None had publicly described Taiwan's weapons purchases as a bargaining chip in negotiations with China.

Taiwan's response was cautious. Presidential Office spokesperson Kuo Ya-hui said the government had "not received any information from the United States that the relevant arms sale would be adjusted." Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense said it had not received notice of a delay.

The U.S. administration had already said publicly at a congressional hearing that the sale was being paused. Taiwan's government still could not confirm whether that change was actually taking place.

That gap says a lot about Taiwan's position in the U.S. decision-making process.

2. What is Trump calculating?

The arms sale makes more sense when viewed alongside other issues Trump has been discussing with Beijing.

The New York Times reported that Taiwan is tied to two other U.S. priorities: access to China's rare earth supplies and China's role in dealing with Iran, including efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

Neither issue is minor.

China's dominance of the rare earth supply chain gives Beijing an effective tool in any trade confrontation with Washington. During Trump's first trade war with China, Beijing's restrictions on rare earth exports were one of the pressures that helped bring the confrontation back toward negotiation. During his second term, Trump has put greater emphasis on maintaining a workable relationship with Beijing.

Iran is another part of the calculation.

At the U.S.-China summit in Beijing in May, Xi offered to help keep shipping through the Strait of Hormuz open and said China would not provide military equipment to Iran. The White House later said the two leaders had reached an understanding on reopening the strait and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

For Trump, that is a diplomatic gain. Keeping Beijing cooperative requires flexibility on other issues.

During the May summit, Xi warned that mishandling the Taiwan issue could have "extremely dangerous" consequences for both Washington and Beijing. After the meeting, Trump again referred to the Taiwan arms sale as "a very good bargaining chip."

In Trump's approach, arms sales to Taiwan are not treated as an untouchable security commitment. They can be used in a broader negotiation with China.

The other issues on the table, rare earths, Iran and trade, all have more immediate consequences for U.S. economic and security interests.

3. Two Trumps, two different calculations

During Trump's first term, the United States approved about US$18.278 billion in arms sales to Taiwan. The administration was dominated by officials such as John Bolton and Mike Pompeo, who pushed a series of measures aimed at strengthening U.S.-Taiwan ties. Arms sales were part of a broader strategy of deterring China.

During Trump's second term, the total approved so far stands at about US$11.435 billion, according to the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. Roughly US$11 billion of that was approved last December. There have been no new large arms packages since then.

White House officials have emphasized that US$11.435 billion is already more than the total approved during Biden's four years in office. Numerically, that comparison is correct.

The difference is in how decisions are being made.

The Biden administration was repeatedly criticized over delays in weapons deliveries, but the direction of policy remained relatively stable and predictable. Under Trump 2.0, decisions are more heavily centralized around the president and his personal preferences.

Former Biden administration official Bonnie Glaser has argued that this makes it harder for Taiwan to understand what Washington wants and harder to influence the decision-making process.

Trump administration officials have also spoken less publicly about Taiwan in recent months.

Hass's interpretation is that Trump does not want Taiwan to interfere with his broader China policy. Asking Taiwanese officials to reduce their visits to Washington think tanks also limits Taiwan's presence in the policy community at a time when the White House is trying to keep sensitive negotiations with Beijing quieter.

4. Taiwan has a defense budget. That does not mean it can buy the weapons.

The delay creates a direct problem for President Lai Ching-te's defense strategy.

Lai's government has pushed for higher defense spending and larger purchases of U.S. weapons, in part under pressure from the Trump administration for allies to spend more on their own defense.

In May, Taiwan's legislature passed the Special Act on the Procurement Program for National Security and Asymmetric Capabilities. The legislation sets an upper budget limit of NT$780 billion, including up to NT$300 billion for the first round of purchases from the United States.

The budget exists. The weapons are still not moving.

That creates a difficult political problem for the Lai administration. If the government asks the public to support higher defense spending on the grounds that Taiwan needs more U.S. weapons, what happens when Washington delays the weapons themselves?

The military consequences are more concrete.

Su Tzu-yun, director of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research's Division of National Defense Strategy and Resources, said that delays to the package could affect Taiwan's air-defense capability. The systems involved, Patriot PAC-3, NASAMS and counter-drone equipment, are all part of Taiwan's planned layered air-defense network.

Hass also pointed to the strategic problem from Beijing's perspective. His argument is straightforward: if China's military capabilities improve faster than Taiwan can acquire the systems needed to respond, the military balance will continue to shift in Beijing's favor.

Inside Taiwan, the arms delay and restrictions on official visits to Washington have become part of a broader political dispute.

KMT communications chief Chen Yi-hsin argued that the failure of Lai Ching-te to secure transit through the continental United States, the delay in arms sales and reports of restrictions on Taiwanese officials meeting Washington think tanks all point to serious problems in U.S.-Taiwan relations, despite repeated claims from Lai's administration that bilateral ties are at their best ever.

Chen's line is blunt: "U.S. interests have never been the same as Taiwan's interests."

5. What leverage does Taiwan still have?

Taiwan has responded by trying to build stronger links with Trump's inner circle.

According to the report, Taipei has hired lobbyists and arranged visits to Taiwan by influential Trump supporters.

The results appear limited so far. Compared with Trump's first term, Taiwan has fewer obvious points of access inside the second Trump administration.

There have also been reports that Jane Perera, the National Security Council's senior director for Asian affairs responsible for Taiwan, had been pushed to the sidelines and no longer had influence over Trump's decisions. The White House has denied that account.

Taiwan still has one major source of leverage: semiconductors.

Nan Le, an assistant professor at National Taiwan University's Graduate Institute of National Development, said Taiwan's largest bargaining asset is its semiconductor industry, the world's largest concentration of advanced chip manufacturing capacity. Trump, she argued, understands at least part of how important Taiwan is to the U.S. economy.

But the limits are obvious.

Semiconductor dependence is an economic relationship. It is not the same thing as having a bargaining chip that can be traded quickly in a geopolitical negotiation. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company's production capacity does not automatically translate into political influence simply because Taipei wants Washington to approve an arms package.

Some analysts expect Republicans and Democrats in Congress to put greater pressure on the Trump administration to approve the delayed sale after the Trump-Xi meeting. Bipartisan congressional support for Taiwan remains an important constraint on Trump's ability to make unilateral concessions.

But Trump's second-term decision-making has been highly personalized, and his administration has already shown a willingness to move foreign-policy initiatives forward without waiting for Congress.

Hass has argued elsewhere that the central risk to U.S.-Taiwan relations is not necessarily an immediate change in policy. It is a change in the way Washington talks about Taiwan: what Taiwan is supposed to mean to the United States, and what Washington is actually trying to achieve in the Taiwan Strait.

Conclusion

US$14 billion is sitting on the table.

Congress approved the package. Trump has not signed it. Trump calls it a bargaining chip. Taiwan says it has received no formal notice of a delay.

Chen Yi-hsin's statement, "U.S. interests have never been the same as Taiwan's interests," has triggered a political argument in Taiwan.

There is no simple answer to that argument.