Friends, Rivals, or Something In Between? How Xi Jinping Manages China’s Most Important Relationships

Friends or Enemies?

Bishkek, August 31, 2026.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit was still under way when Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin sat down together in Bishkek. The two men shook hands, spoke briefly and posed for the cameras. It was a familiar scene. Since Xi came to power, the two leaders have met dozens of times. Putin had visited Beijing only a few months earlier, in May, when the two governments agreed to extend their 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation and signed a series of other agreements. Four months into the year, the relationship had already produced another summit in Central Asia.

Six years earlier, Xi had been asked about his personal relationship with Putin in a joint interview with Russian media.

His answer went well beyond the usual language of diplomacy.

Putin, Xi said, was "my closest foreign colleague" and "my best bosom friend." He recalled travelling with Putin by high-speed train, watching youth hockey together and celebrating a birthday in Bali. The two men also kept in touch by phone and exchanged letters on important national holidays.

Those details can be dismissed as the private rituals of two leaders who happen to get along.

They also tell us something about the way Beijing has handled its relationship with Moscow.

Xi can describe Putin as a close friend and still negotiate with Donald Trump. He can maintain a strategic partnership with Russia while dealing with Narendra Modi over a disputed border, trade and regional security.

"Friend" is therefore too small a word to explain the relationships around China.

Putin: Personal familiarity, backed by institutions

There is a strong personal element to the Xi-Putin relationship. But personal friendship alone cannot explain where the relationship stands in 2026.

When Putin came to Beijing in May, the talks covered energy, trade, technology and wider international affairs. The two presidents also agreed to extend their long-standing bilateral treaty. Beijing's official record described that treaty as part of the institutional foundation of the relationship.

That distinction matters.

A treaty does not disappear because two leaders have a bad meeting. Energy contracts continue. Government working groups continue. Trade continues. Officials keep meeting even when the cameras are gone.

The same applies to the broader China-Russia relationship. Beijing and Moscow have spent years building regular channels for cooperation, from energy and transport to diplomatic coordination. Their governments have also continued signing concrete agreements. During Putin's May visit, the two sides released a list of documents covering areas including urban development, cross-border rail infrastructure, nuclear fusion research and trade.

Putin, then, occupies two roles in Xi's foreign policy.

He is a leader with whom Xi has built an unusually familiar working relationship.

He is also the head of a major state with its own interests, resources and constraints.

The personal connection helps. It gives both sides a shorter route to the top when a difficult issue needs to be discussed. But the relationship is held together by much more than private trust.

That is why the word "friend" matters in the China-Russia relationship without being enough to describe it.

Trump: frequent contact, lasting competition

The other table is in Washington.

Xi is scheduled to visit the United States from September 23 to 25 at Trump's invitation. The White House says Trump will greet Xi at Joint Base Andrews on September 23, followed by a formal state arrival ceremony at the White House on September 24. It will be Xi's first White House visit in more than a decade.

The schedule tells us something simple.

China and the United States still have serious disagreements, but their leaders still need to talk directly.

The subjects on the table are practical. Trade. Strategic minerals and rare earths. Artificial intelligence and advanced technology. Taiwan. The war involving Iran.

None of these questions can be settled by calling each other friends.

That is the basic difference between the atmosphere around the Xi-Putin relationship and the one around Xi and Trump.

With Putin, the language of friendship has become part of the public description of the relationship.

With Trump, the relationship has to be worked out issue by issue.

How long will a trade arrangement last?

What happens to restrictions on strategic technology?

How will rare-earth supplies be handled?

What does each side want from the other on Taiwan?

How much room is there for cooperation while both governments continue to compete?

These are negotiating questions. They do not disappear because the two men get along in person.

Trump has imposed sweeping tariffs on Chinese goods and pursued restrictions affecting technology and supply chains. At the same time, he has maintained direct contact with Xi. The two things can exist together. A government can negotiate with another country on one issue while applying pressure on it somewhere else.

For Beijing, the immediate objective is not to turn Trump into a friend.

It is to keep the negotiations going.

Modi: personal diplomacy cannot erase a border

The relationship with Narendra Modi shows the limit of personal diplomacy more clearly.

Xi and Modi spent years building a direct relationship. They held informal meetings and gave considerable attention to personal contact between the two leaders. The format was deliberately less formal than a conventional state visit. The hope was that direct communication could reduce suspicion between Asia's two largest countries.

The border did not disappear.

In June 2020, Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh. At least 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers were killed, according to Reuters. It was the first deadly encounter between the two countries in decades and triggered a prolonged military and diplomatic crisis.

After that, the problem was no longer simply one of political atmosphere.

Troops had to be managed.

Border positions had to be discussed.

Existing agreements had to be interpreted.

Trade and investment became harder to separate from national security.

The lesson was straightforward. Two leaders can establish a good personal rapport while their governments continue to face a structural dispute.

The relationship has since begun to recover.

On September 12, 2026, Xi and Modi met in New Delhi on the sidelines of the BRICS summit. According to India's prime minister's office, the discussion covered peace and stability along the border, existing agreements, trade imbalances, supply chains, market access and people-to-people ties. Both sides agreed that differences should not turn into disputes.

Look at the agenda.

The border comes first.

Then trade.

Then supply chains and market access.

Then movement between the two countries.

None of these can be settled by personal chemistry alone.

The renewed dialogue does not mean the boundary dispute has been resolved. India continues to treat peace and tranquillity in the border areas as a condition for the broader development of bilateral relations.

A friendly handshake can be captured by a camera.

The harder work begins after the cameras leave.

Friends and enemies are poor categories for diplomacy

It is convenient to divide countries into friends and enemies.

Government policy does not work that way.

A country can cooperate on energy while competing over security. It can negotiate over trade while restricting technology transfers. It can keep troops on alert along a border while restoring flights, business links or cultural exchanges.

China's relationships with Russia, the United States and India all contain some version of this mix.

A long-term agreement with Russia does not eliminate every difference between Moscow and Beijing.

Competition with Washington does not prevent the two sides from negotiating.

A continuing territorial dispute with India does not prevent cooperation in trade or multilateral institutions.

The important questions are more specific.

On which issues do the two countries have overlapping interests?

Where do those interests collide?

Which disputes can be managed?

Which issues are tied to national security and therefore much harder to compromise?

And how much communication can be maintained when the two sides disagree?

At a negotiating table, several contradictory things can sit next to each other.

A cooperation agreement can sit beside a sanctions list.

Trade figures can sit beside military plans.

A public handshake can sit beside a private disagreement over a red line.

That is normal diplomacy.

Personal ties can help. They cannot replace the state.

Xi and Putin have met more than forty times since Xi took power, according to Chinese official accounts and the long record of their bilateral and multilateral meetings. The personal side of that relationship is unusually visible. Xi himself has spoken about travelling with Putin, watching hockey and celebrating birthdays together.

There is a practical benefit to that familiarity.

People who have spent years across the table from each other do not have to begin every conversation by explaining who they are or what they want.

But familiarity does not remove bargaining.

The May 2026 China-Russia summit still produced agreements on energy, trade, transport, technology and the extension of their bilateral treaty.

The same logic applies to Trump.

Even when Trump and Xi exchange friendly remarks, officials on both sides still have to work through tariffs, export controls, agricultural purchases, rare-earth supplies, artificial intelligence and Taiwan.

One meeting can produce a warm photograph.

The next document can contain a restriction.

There is nothing unusual about that.

For major powers, keeping a difficult relationship under control can itself be a policy objective.

Washington, September 24

On September 24, Xi will appear at the White House for a formal state arrival ceremony.

The cameras will record the red carpet, the military ceremony, the handshake and the state dinner.

The more important details will be in the negotiations.

Washington wants more predictable access to rare earths and other strategic minerals. The United States also has continuing concerns about advanced technology and artificial intelligence. Beijing wants trade arrangements that remain workable and will press its own concerns, including Taiwan. The two governments are entering the meeting with overlapping interests and serious disagreements at the same time.

As of September 22, the meeting has not yet taken place. Any claim about its final outcome would therefore be speculation.

One fact is already clear.

The two governments have decided that the meeting should happen.

That matters because a breakdown in communication can become a problem of its own. Disagreement is manageable when officials continue talking. It becomes harder when each side starts making decisions without knowing what the other side will do next.

Friends are not a permanent category

Putin is the foreign leader Xi has publicly described as his "best bosom friend." Their relationship now rests on years of meetings, treaties, energy ties, trade and diplomatic coordination.

Trump represents something different.

The United States and China remain competitors in technology, trade and security, yet their presidents continue to meet because neither side can simply walk away from the relationship. The September 23 to 25 Washington visit is the latest example.

Modi represents a third case.

The two leaders can restore contact without settling the border dispute. Trade can recover while security concerns remain. The September meeting put those unresolved issues back into a formal diplomatic discussion rather than pretending they had disappeared.

That is why "friend or enemy" is too simple a question.

A government does not have to trust another government on every issue to negotiate with it.

It does not have to share its strategic goals to sign an agreement.

And it does not have to like another leader to keep the phone line open.

When Xi walks into the White House on September 24, the cameras will record another handshake.

The more useful record will come afterward.

Which agreements survive?

Which disputes remain?

Which promises turn into policy?

And when the next disagreement comes, do the two sides still have a reason to pick up the phone?