Experts’ Predictions on Russia’s Military Strength in 2022

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has become a significantly more capable military power because of the New Look military modernization initiative, which began in late 2008. Attempts to restructure Russia’s armed forces have been made in the past, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the New Look was sparked by a lackluster performance in the October 2008 battle with Georgia, increased political will, and improved financial conditions. The State Armament Program 2011–20 played a critical role in achieving re-equipment goals.

The strategic and aerospace forces have made the most progress, with the strategic and aerospace forces, along with the navy, having more modern equipment than the ground troops. Both in the services and at a higher level, command and control have been a focus of attention: in 2014, a National Defense Management Center was established.

Through effective military incursions in Crimea, the covert campaign in eastern Ukraine, and the Syrian crisis, Russia’s armed forces earned considerable operational experience. Many senior Russian military officers served in Syria, and unlike the case in Georgia in 2008, when some combat aircrew had to be recalled from test centres, the Russian pilots deployed to Syria were from frontline units. Another goal was to ultimately break free from the Soviet paradigm of mass mobilization and create a force that was not reliant on conscription and mobilization. Overall, the effort to build a contract service cadre of professionals was a success, not only in shifting the military’s balance away from conscripts and toward contract service people, but also in enhancing readiness.

Forces on the ground

Since the start of the New Look, Russia’s ground forces have developed dramatically. New equipment has arrived, albeit in smaller quantities than expected. Instead, the focus has been on modernizing existing platforms and integrating more precise and longer-range weaponry.

Perhaps the most significant shift in the ground forces has been in terms of organization and human resources. Authorities intended to reform the ground forces such that the brigade became their primary unit of action in the early years of the New Look, with the goal of producing self-sustaining mobile formations of the type that would be needed on Russia’s perimeter. Contract personnel recruitment, on the other hand, did not keep up with the goal.

Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) were launched in 2012 to develop effective combat strength from brigades by concentrating contract men into a battalion-sized grouping (a concept that dates back to the 1990s). A tank or infantry battalion is usually reinforced with armour or infantry, as well as artillery, air defence, electronic warfare, and other combat support capabilities.

However, lessons learnt from testing and the crisis in Ukraine, as well as rising tensions with Western powers and a requirement for formations that could more quickly provide higher-level combat support (such as heavy artillery) and combat service support, supported the decision to reinstate divisional formations.

Even by the Russian Ministry of Defense’s own standards, little progress has been made in re-equipping the ground forces with new-generation equipment, but this is affected to some extent by the amount of legacy armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) in service. The tank fleet has been modernised, but mostly by improvements to older tanks such as the T-72, with the T-72B3/B3M and, to a lesser extent, the T-90M and T-80 BVMs being fielded.

The introduction of the new generation of armoured vehicles displayed at the 2015 Victory Day Parade, such as the T-14 main battle tank (MBT) and the T-15 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), which are still in state testing, has made less progress. However, deliveries of the Koalitsiya-SV 155mm self-propelled howitzer to training units have begun. Existing self-propelled artillery, such as the 2S19M2, are also getting upgrades. Heavier calibre systems, such as the 203 mm 2S7M, have also been updated.

The recapitalization of missile and rocket artillery units has made significant progress. The 500-kilometer-range 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone) has taken the place of the 120-kilometer-range Tochka-U (RS-SS-21 Scarab), and 13 additional Iskander battalions have been constructed. Both ballistic and cruise missiles can be used in the Iskander system. The Tornado-S system has been added to the existing BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launcher system, and the Tornado-G system has been added to the shorter-range BM-21 Grad system. Mobile, layered air defence is also a strength of the ground forces, with systems capable of engaging at various altitudes and ranges. Electronic warfare capabilities are also strong, with new technologies added in recent years.

The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) are an important part of the country’s high-readiness capability. The VDV was spared from the ground forces’ reorganisation efforts and preserved its divisional structure. Their numbers were bolstered in the early 2010s when the army’s air-assault brigades were added to their ranks. BMD-4M Airborne combat vehicles and BTR-MDM APCs have been introduced in recent years, as have vehicles such as BTR-82AM IFVs and T-72B3 MBTs for conventional combat troops. There has been some force testing, including drills ostensibly aimed at developing heliborne air assault capacity.

Navies

Since 2008, Russia’s naval forces have seen significant transformations in terms of capabilities and posture. The introduction of the 3M14 Kalibr (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) long-range precision land-attack cruise missile (LACM) on multiple surfaces and submarine platforms in the fleet has given the navy a significant new role, allowing Moscow to put an opponent’s critical land-based infrastructure at risk from the sea. The LACM raids into Syria by submarine and surface units from the Caspian Sea and the eastern Mediterranean show this clearly. In recent years, especially after 2014, the navy’s speed of operations and assertiveness have also intensified.

Project 21631 Buyan-M and Project 22800 Karakurt corvettes, as well as the similarly equipped Project 06363 upgraded Kilo submarines, have all been introduced as new small and medium-sized surface combatants armed with Kalibr. These ships contribute to the navy’s ‘brown water’ active defense in-depth capability. The development of the very capable Project 885/Project 08851 Yasen/Yasen-M missile-armed nuclear-powered submarines has also improved submarine capabilities. They pose a significant anti-submarine warfare problem, despite their debut taking much longer than expected.

Indeed, a sluggish shipbuilding industry, hampered further by sanctions, has caused the pace and scope of naval modernization to fall short of stated goals. Russia’s ‘blue-water’ naval capabilities are limited, and it is still heavily reliant on Soviet-era platforms. Similarly, despite recent deployment activity, amphibious capabilities remain a vulnerability, a situation made worse by the abandonment of a deal with France to equip big aviation-capable amphibious assault ships known as the Mistral.

The acquisition of Crimea, on the other hand, dramatically strengthened Russia’s military and nautical position in the Black Sea. The deployment of upgraded land-based equipment has played a big role in this improved position, but the Black Sea Fleet has also benefited from significant capability investment. The fleet is now in a far stronger position, especially for blockades and denying Ukraine sea access.

Forces of aviation

The Russian air force’s poor performance during the brief war with Georgia in 2008 resulted from years of underinvestment in human resources and equipment. Moscow now has a more capable, well-equipped air force to threaten Kyiv, as well as battle experience garnered in Syria.

The air force has replaced most of its single-role fighters, such as the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker and MiG MiG-29 Fulcrum, with multi-role fighter ground attack variants such the Su-35S Flanker M, Su-30SM Flanker H, and Su-34 Fullback, over the last decade. There has also been a considerable focus on modernizing rotary-wing aviation, with the introduction of the Mi-28N Havoc and Ka-52 Hokum attack helicopters, albeit these programmes are quite old. The Mi-26 Halo remains the mainstay of heavy transport, with indications of work on a replacement underway, however even less is known about a potential replacement for the legendary medium transport Mi-8.

A long-overdue and much-needed update of its air-to-air missile (AAM) stockpile is also in the works, with better short, medium, and long-range AAMs entering service in the mid-2010s. For the first time, the air force used two types of long-range land strike cruise missiles during the Syrian operation. The Raduga Kh-555 (RS-AS-22 Kluge), a conventionally armed variant of the nuclear-armed Kh-55 (RS-AS-15 Kent), and the Raduga Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A Kodiak) were fired from Tupolev Tu-95 Bear H and Tu-160 Blackjack A bomber aircraft. The Kh-555 and Kh-101 give the air force a long-range stand-off land-attack capability that it desperately needs.

The air force is making slower headway in restocking its tactical air-to-surface missiles. The vast majority of its short-range air-to-surface guided missiles are Soviet-era designs, with no newer versions appearing to have made it to the front lines in any significant numbers. The Kh-38M family of air-to-surface missiles from Tactical Missile Systems Corp. should be in the air force inventory by now, but they have yet to be sighted at an operational installation. The project, which has been in the works for decades, aims to replace the Kh-25M (RS-AS-12 Kegler) and Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge) tactical air-to-surface missiles developed during the Soviet era.

To Wrap It Up!

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