400M saved, 5B earned — but East Buy isn't back to its peak.

After Dong Yuhui Left, East Buy Cut Payroll by RMB 400 Million and Made RMB 500 Million in Profit

On August 21, 2026, after the Hong Kong market closed, East Buy released its first full‑fiscal‑year results since Dong Yuhui's departure and the resignations of four core hosts.

Revenue reached RMB 5.701 billion, up 29.8% year on year. Operating profit swung from a loss of RMB 110 million to a gain of RMB 663 million. Net profit for the year was RMB 544 million, an 86‑fold increase.

But the figure that really caught the market's attention was a different contrast: headcount rose from 1,401 to 1,812—up by 411 people. Total compensation fell from RMB 1.2 billion to RMB 800 million—a reduction of RMB 400 million.

The "de‑headliner" strategy has paid off financially.

Yet the RMB 544 million net profit still falls short of the RMB 971 million in FY2023 and the RMB 1.72 billion in FY2024. East Buy has proved in one year that it can remain profitable without Dong Yuhui. Whether it can return to—or surpass—its former profit peak is the chapter still unwritten.

1. The RMB 400 Million Cut Wasn't from Layoffs

More staff (up by 411 people) but less pay (down by RMB 400 million). The contrast points to one thing: the compensation structure has changed.

The platform no longer pays outsized commissions to a handful of top hosts. The huge sums that once flowed to individuals have now been converted into net profit for the company.

In the Dong Yuhui era, the total cost of a single top host could reportedly reach the hundreds of millions of yuan. Those were historical contracts designed to lock in the best IP at the most generous terms. East Buy's financial structure was essentially working for a super‑host—traffic and profits were heavily dependent on one person's livestream, and costs were rigid and incompressible.

Dong Yuhui left. In April this year, Mingming, Tianquan, Zhongcan, and Linlin all announced their resignations within days. The batch of hosts carrying those "historic top‑tier contracts" were all cleared out. Average compensation per person fell from RMB 856,000 to RMB 442,000. That's not a pay cut—it's a contractual reset.

The new Executive President, Sun Jin, took a straightforward approach: compensation is no longer tied to an uncontrollable personal aura, but linked to the output efficiency of vertical accounts. The company doesn't bet on explosive GMV growth; it first calculates the break‑even point for each account, then decides whether to invest.

Yu Minhong learned this lesson the hard way at New Oriental: a company's fate cannot be tied to a single person. Weather the short‑term public backlash, shed the historical burden, and what you regain is control over profits.

2. Self‑Branded GMV Breaks 50% for the First Time

"De‑headliner" is subtraction. Growing self‑branded products is the harder part.

East Buy's total GMV reached RMB 10.2 billion, up 36.4%. Self‑branded products accounted for more than half of total GMV for the first time—52.6%. Self‑branded SKUs expanded to 1,009, contributing 85% of total revenue.

Consumers are shifting from "paying for Dong Yuhui" to "paying for the East Buy brand."

The livestream rooms are no longer dominated by a single super‑IP but by a matrix of over 80 mid‑tier hosts, supported by 18 vertical accounts. The rooms are no longer popularity stages—they've become distribution channels for the self‑branded products.

East Buy wants to tell the story of "China's Costco or Sam's Club"—making money through curated products and supply‑chain premiums, not through host commissions. Brand retailers typically command higher price‑to‑earnings multiples than agencies dependent on a single individual. That's why the capital markets are willing to give it a higher valuation.

This story rests on two conditions: sufficiently high repurchase rates and no systemic quality‑control failures.

Rapid SKU expansion to 1,009 puts pressure on the supply chain. Nearly 2,000 product‑quality complaints have accumulated on the Black Cat complaint platform. When a livestream no longer carries the personal endorsement of a Dong Yuhui, any quality slip damages the brand more directly than before.

3. The Four Hosts' Departure: The End of a Contractual Era

In April, Mingming, Tianquan, Zhongcan, and Linlin all announced their resignations within days. All four mentioned that they "found it difficult to adapt to the operational changes brought by the new management."

Two of them—Tianquan and Mingming—went on to co‑found a new company with former East Buy CEO Sun Dongxu and re‑entered the livestream e‑commerce space.

These departures are not ordinary staff turnover. They sever East Buy's last ties to the "super‑host era." From Dong Yuhui to the "F4," all the core figures who once served as traffic levers in the early days are now gone. And with them went the most expensive, highest‑commission historical contracts.

By clearing these contracts, the company finally regained control over profit distribution. The price was a one‑time hit from public scrutiny, short‑term performance volatility, and stock‑price turbulence. After the pain subsided, the historical burden was gone.

This is where East Buy differs from Fengxue Weilai (the company built around influencer Zhang Xuefeng). Fengxue Weilai's traffic and user trust are almost entirely tied to Zhang Xuefeng as an individual. East Buy now has more weight vested in its supply chain, platform infrastructure, and standardized operations than in any single host. Profitability is one thing—whether the business model belongs to the platform or to an individual is what ultimately decides who truly owns the company.

4. Profit Up 86‑Fold, but Scale Has Not Returned to Its Peak

RMB 544 million net profit—up 86‑fold year on year.

But looking at the longer timeline, this figure still sits below the RMB 971 million in FY2023 and the RMB 1.72 billion in FY2024. The "de‑headliner" move made the model healthier, but it also dealt a blow to profit scale. Without a top host bringing in traffic for free, East Buy has to spend more on marketing and customer acquisition to sustain RMB 10.2 billion in GMV. For now, that extra cost is partially offset by the compensation savings.

Another signal worth watching: revenue growth from the app channel slowed from 22% to 18%. Building private traffic hasn't been smooth. As public‑domain traffic on platforms like Douyin reaches saturation, whether East Buy can continue to acquire new customers at low cost after losing its top host remains a long‑term variable.

When the headliner was present, traffic came free. Without the headliner, traffic has to be paid for. The cost difference between these two scenarios is currently hedged in part by compensation savings, but over the long run, the trajectory of customer‑acquisition costs will determine the ceiling on the new model's profit margins.

5. A Provisional Win, but the Game Isn't Over

This earnings report proves one thing: the "de‑headliner" model is viable.

East Buy weathered the upheaval of Dong Yuhui and the "F4" leaving, survived the public backlash and stock‑price swings, and proved through standardized operations and self‑branded products that it no longer depends on any single person.

But measured against "getting back to the top," the transformation has only just begun. RMB 544 million in profit is still a long way from RMB 1.72 billion. Whether self‑branded repurchase rates can hold up, whether the supply chain can support rapid SKU expansion, whether the mid‑tier host matrix can generate enough traffic‑carrying capacity, and whether private‑domain development can break through its growth slowdown—these are all variables still to be proven.

East Buy can finally say goodbye to Dong Yuhui and his peers. What lies ahead is: harsher market scrutiny, more demanding consumers, and a much longer brand‑building cycle.

That road is far harder than keeping one genius host.