Morality and Apology in the Public Eye

Following Robin William’s suicide in 2014, there was an outpouring of celebrity apologies due to their less than polite reactions and/or previous statements on depression and suicide (Norton). For example, Shepard Smith “apologized for having the nerve to question whether it made Williams a coward” (Norton). Yet, every day these less than profound apologies are released by celebrities at the demand of the public. Anything from licking a donut in a bakery to racial slurs are treated in the same way: a public apology is demanded. Therefore, I suggest that the issuance of public apologies by celebrities in the public eye, regarding a large range of offenses, is not morally praiseworthy. This claim is primarily supported through Derrida’s understanding of forgiveness and its possibilities. Furthermore, I suggest a placeholder for the “I’m sorry—“it’s okay,” format of communication we understand today in regard to accidents or minor offenses.

First of all, we must question the multiple acts that celebrities are demanded to apologize for and question whether said response is elicited. Jacques Derrida suggests an extremely different understanding of forgiveness in which there is a paradox surrounding forgiveness and the acts which beg for it. He states, “if one is only prepared to forgive what appears forgivable, what the church calls venial sin, then the very idea of forgiveness would disappear. If there is something to forgive, it would be what in religious language is called mortal sin, the worst, the unforgivable crime or harm… forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable” (Derrida, 32). Derrida continues to define the difference between pure and conditional forgiveness. Pure forgiveness, he suggests, is the “unconditional, gracious, infinite, aneconomic forgiveness” (Derrida, 34). Whereas, on the other hand, conditional forgiveness expects a recognition of the perpetrator’s trespassing, a repentance, and a “transformation of the sinner who then explicitly asks [for] forgiveness” (Derrida, 35). Therefore, with this understanding of forgiveness, the demand for public apology for anything other than heinous crimes does not have meaning to begin with. Essentially, how can one demand an apology for an act which cannot be granted pure forgiveness? And, how can one deliver that apology without forgiveness as the outcome. Therefore, the validity of the apology depends tremendously on the potential for forgiveness; if forgiveness is not possible an apology completely loses its purpose.

Consequently, if an apology does not have a purpose in the case of celebrity public apologies for minor offenses, why does the public continue to demand them and why do celebrities continue to comply? Furthermore, how does this compliance effect the morality of the public apology? Considering celebrities are always acting in the public eye, the visibility of their misdemeanors is crucial to the expectation of apology demanded of them. For example, had Arianna Grande not been a celebrity, her statement that she “hates Americans” (Brait) would not have gone viral nor would it have elicited any need for an apology, let alone a public apology. Similarly, Shepard Smith’s questioning of Robin Williams’ potential cowardice was unmatched by the innumerable amount of tweets, Facebook posts, and interpersonal conversations which expressed the same idea toward Williams’ suicide; yet, Shepard Smith was demanded to apologize because he was in the public eye. This visibility leads to what Jim Norton calls “a predictable cycle of outrage and apology” (Norton). The predictability that Norton mentions is extremely important to Derrida’s argument regarding the validity of apology and forgiveness. Considering Derrida’s concept of pure forgiveness, he also holds that forgiveness should not be expected, normalized, or internalized. He states: “Forgiveness is not, it should not be, normal, normative, normalizing. It should remain exceptional and extraordinary, in the face of the impossible: as if it interrupted the ordinary course of historical temporality” (Derrida, 32). Therefore, this theater of forgiveness, meaning the cycle of offensive act, demanded apology, and public apology from the offender, continues to normalize forgiveness. It takes it out of the sphere of the impossible, the exceptional, or the extraordinary because it is expected, ritualized, and internalized. It is used as a way to normalize a situation, rather than for the purpose of pure forgiveness without condition or expectation.

Furthermore, Derrida suggests that the public scale on which this theater of forgiveness is displayed is problematic in and of itself. He states, “forgiveness must engage two singularities: the guilty… and the victim. As soon as a third party intervenes, one can again speak of amnesty, reconciliation, reparation, etc., but certainly not of pure forgiveness in the strict sense” (Derrida, 42). Derrida suggests that the inclusion of individuals outside of the guilty and the victim completely diminishes the possibility of pure forgiveness. Therefore, considering the public scale on which these celebrity apologies rely, pure forgiveness is once again not possible, reducing the validity and morality of the apology itself. For example, in the case of crimes against humanity, such as in the case of a Nazi prison guard, as the guilty party, forgiveness could only be granted to him by his victims. Therefore, if a celebrity does commit a crime against humanity, which would put them in the running for exceptional, impossible, pure forgiveness, the transaction of forgiveness cannot occur on the stage of forgiveness, in the public eye.

Moreover, the normalization of conditional forgiveness, rather than adherence to the extraordinary pure forgiveness, and the scale of which celebrity apologies present themselves includes a question of morality regarding the act of apologizing itself. When a celebrity is demanded to apologize as Shepard Smith or Arianna Grande had, is it morally sound for these celebrities to apologize to the public for their acts or statements? I would suggest that due to the expectation of apology, and the cyclical nature of this theater of apology, one who apologizes to the public for something which is not an act against humanity is not acting in a morally praiseworthy way. One is not using their own rationality in order to determine the possibility of pure forgiveness within their potential apology. Rather, they are acting out of a public expectation of apology instead of a personal adherence to good will and rationality. Therefore, their inauthentic purposes in apologizing disintegrates the chance for moral praise. Furthermore, as previously stated pure forgiveness can only be granted for the unforgivable, without condition or expectation, and it can only be granted between the guilt and the victim; therefore, the act of apologizing without any possibility of pure forgiveness furthers the frequency of conditional forgiveness which deepens the understanding of forgiveness as a ritual, a normalization technique, a reconciliation, etc. Therefore, by further perpetuating this conditional understanding of forgiveness, I would further suggest that this act of celebrity apology is not morally praiseworthy.

With Derrida’s concept of forgiveness in place, I believe it is important to address the “typical” understanding of forgiveness considering much of our society depends on the “I’m sorry”—“It’s okay,” framework that we come in contact with daily. For example, if someone accidentally bumps into you when walking down the sidewalk, the transaction we expect is “I’m sorry.”—“It’s okay.” Yet, Derrida would discount this possibility for forgiveness because it is quite obviously not an unforgivable act. Nonetheless, I would suggest a type of placeholder for this interaction which allows a repentance that is not pure forgiveness. I believe there is room in our society for something other than Derrida’s concept of pure forgiveness, and I would suggest the recognition of conditional forgiveness could be helpful when understanding these minor transgressions in context with the acts against humanity. One can still forgive another, for the minor transgression, in a conditional manner which would not harm the existence or understanding of pure forgiveness. Furthermore, the separation and recognition of these two separate types of forgiveness allows for the importance and power of pure forgiveness to transcend without requiring a resocialization of our society to ensure apologies and forgiveness is not spewed during minor transgressions. However, regardless of this place for conditional forgiveness, the need for apology and forgiveness to happen between the guilty and victim is still required. Therefore, the public scale on which celebrities apologize daily would nonetheless make their choice of apology unqualified for moral praise.

In conclusion, in accordance with Derrida’s guidelines, forgivable acts cannot be granted pure forgiveness. Furthermore, apologies are not meaningful without the possibility of forgiveness and are merely ritualistic. Therefore, apologies made for misdemeanors, and consequently without the possibility of pure forgiveness, such as in the case of celebrity apologies, are inauthentic, and thus diminishing the apologizer’s possibility for moral praise.

Works Cited:

Brait, Ellen. "Ariana Grande Apologizes for Doughnut Video: 'I'm so Disgusted with Myself'" The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 10 July 2015. Web. 13 Feb. 2016.

Derrida, Jacques. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. London: Routledge, 2001. Print.

Norton, Jim. "It's Time for Celebrities To Apologize-For All Their Apologizing." Time. Time, 27 Aug. 2014. Web. 14 Feb. 2016.