How the British Kept India Divided

History has often provided us with factual occurrences about racism and its perils throughout the world, but never enough to point out the legacy left behind in a constitution by those racist ideologies.

One doctrine procreated by our colonial supremacists continues to carve a presence in shaping the recruitment process of the Indian Army.

India is a land of adequate riches marked by the ethnicity of secularism, yet she remains one nation shrouded under the systematic stratification of creed distinctions. Those questions are prevalent even in the solid structure of the modern Indian Army when the doctrine of martial races took birth and then codified in the wake of the Indian Uprising of 1857.

This peculiar process of militant selection would soon surface over administrative conscience to act as a leading basis for the recruitment policy of the Indian Army.

The British superiors decided to induce a martial race-themed recruitment. It established a consensus about some ethnic, religious castes, or social races having a more dominant character in comparison to those races that provided a direct threat to the subservient ways of the Empire.

The martial races were braver and loyal, while the others were vulnerable to harboring treason or incapable of being valuable soldiers in times of war.

Such an accusation conceals the ugly truth that the latter were often members of higher castes and intelligible societies. Many understood politics, so they were suspicious and undeserving of higher official posts under British authority.

The concept originated from personal experience and observation by white superiors. They amplified the caste system instigated by ancient Hindus on the Kshatriyas and the non-Kshatriyas and introduced two sections of the society — the martial and the non-martial clans.

Sikhs (from Punjab) and Gorkhas (Nepalese) who did not take a stand against the British during the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 enjoyed prime importance. The educated classes of Bengalis were out of the equation for playing a role in instigating the first rebellion against the colonial regime.

The change came in 1857, but it gained prominence only around 1895. Rather than prioritizing the values of loyalty and reliability, the recruitment policy operated on the personal biases of Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts and a few other officials.

The policymakers of the pre-1857 Bengal Army believed that only tall wheat-eating peasants were applicable for producing elite soldiers among the Indian lot. Young Yeoman farmers were the healthiest and could also excel in warfare via their acute sense of dog-willed determination.

Inferior citizens like artisans or cobblers faced rejection, while higher caste people received praise as practitioners of orderly conduct and utter loyalty. The wheat-eating Brahmins and Rajputs from Bihar and Awadh were eligible for recruitment because they were tall natives. The Bengal Army recruits had to be at least 1.73 meters.

William Bentinck, the first Governor General of India, had come to a personal understanding that the North Indian high castes were bolder and more martial in thought and appearance than the Madrassas of the south.

There was also a slight recognition in the Madras Army that martial recruitment was a monopoly practiced by certain ethnic groups. The military regulations of 1765 rendered recruitment only to the Rajputs, Telegus, and Muslims.

The physical features of the recruits were of prime importance, as Colonel Floyd had declared the southern men were short in stature, making them ineligible for holding their line during a war.

H.T. Prinsep advocated for the replacement of the peninsular men by the Purbiyas, who measured in equal strength and wit to that of British soldiers.

Tamils suffered the accusation of being brute beasts, while the Indian Catholics drew criticisms of being dirty and alcoholic.

The first argument for heralding only certain races from specific regions as martial clans arises from a self-induced conviction. The British believed these races were born to be warriors, and they did not entertain the idea of leading a settled and peaceful life. These people did not need a complex reason to take up arms and prepare for a fight.

Such a conservative concept grew deep in the minds of the British elite, and it found stagnation in administrative policies over the whole country. The doctrine culminated in full bloom across the four major regional armies — the Madras Army, the Bombay Army, the Bengal Army, and the Punjab Frontier Force.

This matter of selective enrollment sparked a lengthy debate between the Orient and the Occident. The Occident advocated for a logical sense of country-wide general employment, but the Orient demanded ruthlessness while assessing colonial recruits.

Roberts harbored a belief that only North West Indians like the Pathans, Dogras, Sikhs, and Gorkhas were born martial to the core.

The rest were vermin.

Roberts, as vile as his concept of the martial race was, had his aggrieved reasons to thank for his determination. He left no stone unturned to administer the workings of the doctrine to full effect. He despised the lackluster performances the Indian troops had shown

01. in the Terai during the Nepal War (1814–1815)

02. in the swamps of the First Burma War

03. and in the hot plains of Punjab during the two Sikh Wars.

But he seemed to be oblivious to the fact that Indian troops did not receive training in the art of mountainous warfare. They were not suited for successful campaigns in the hilly regions of Nepal and the North West Frontier, nor were they ever drilled for battling the apt Burmese in the scorching confines of the forest.

Line tactics were only effective on plain ground, but the white officers escaped punishment for drilling the Indian soldiers to battle using improper methods.

The British have long left the nation. After 75 years of independence, India has evolved to a point today where her GDP (Gross Development Product) exceeds that of her former oppressors. But their delirious concept of recruitment remains prevalent in our country's roots.

Its largest state employers continue to profile recruits based on a pre-constitutional norm.

Such a devolving theory in practice goes against the very fabric of India. It had promised commitment to deliver a civil-military dynamic, and that dynamic was to render the military answerable to the elected civil government.