Can Cognition Be Explained by Folk Psychology?

Ever since perception was thought to be regulated by animal spirits, neuroscientists and philosophers have come a long way when discovering cognition. However, there has been a great deal of debate over who should continue the search for answers. Many of the current methods used to explain this phenomenon have been grounded in folk psychology (FP)—which is, briefly, the set of common sense concepts that we use to predict and explain behavior and which many believe fails to offer the reliable explanations that are required for this largely unknown mind to brain relationship. This work identifies the challenges to neuroscientific attempts to understand the mind, including the opinions from Churchland, Slors, Anderson, and Hamilton, each offering their own views on current methods and how research should be continued by neuroscience. As well, we will discuss what challenges may arise and how neuroscientists must work to overcome them.

Previously proposed by FP, the Theory of the Mind claims that we are able to predict and explain each other’s behaviour based on reference to internal mental states. Mental states are believed to consist of representations, ideas, beliefs, and intentions, all of which cannot be seen, localized, or objectively measured. Included in this is cognition, defined as the ability to acquire knowledge and understanding through use of thought, experience, and the senses. Examples of cognitive functions include working memory, attention, reading, and other mental processes we use to navigate the world around us. However, one aim of neuroscience is to explain these functions by appeal to the physical states of the brain. This leaves open the question of how neuroscientific theory and folk psychological theory are to be related.

Different authors have provided different answers to this question. Paul Churchland for example claims that in eliminating the propositional attitudes, neuroscience will be able to discover such concepts and create new methods of futuristic communication, as we “… learn to exchange information and coordinate their behavior with the same intimacy…(as our) own cerebral hemispheres.” (Churchill, 2015, p.88) He believes that this language will eventually become learnable, and neuroscience will progress.

In their work, in contrast, Francken and Slors (2014) mention the folk psychological Common Sense Concepts (CCCs) and Scientific Cognitive Concepts (SCCs) that neuroscientists currently use to classify cognitive concepts, in which CCCs, such as working memory, attention, reading, are translated into narrower SCCs, and further into sub-concepts and operationalized tasks. The initial breadth of such concepts determines the resulting specificity of localization in the brain. The corresponding brain activation for each task will then be applied back to the initial CCC.

Slors describes the narrower SCCs as “scientifically ‘cleaned-up’ versions.” (p.247) However, they criticize their relative difference in breadth, thus the resulting brain localizations, being based on SCCs, will not be reflective of the CCC. Similar issues exist at each proceeding translation from SCCs to sub concepts and further into experimentalized tasks. Issues also arise through neural degeneration, in which each brain region is activated with multiple cognitive tasks. Due to this variability, scientists can only guess what cognitive concepts are represented in each of these tasks that are employed. As well, each scientist studying the same concept may employ different sub concepts, tasks, and understandings of terms, resulting in many different interpretations of a CCC. All together, they believe this creates an unsystematic relationship between each step of the process.

As such, Slors suggest that neuroscientists must adjust their interpretations by determining the amount of overlap between different sub-concepts. They also suggest a common ontology across difference disciplines, eliminating variable understandings through shared concepts and tasks. An example of this involves a Cognitive Atlas in which “SCCs can be systematically related to other concepts, to the tasks that are used to assess them, and to the neural mechanisms underlying them.” (p.252) This will pose another challenge in which all disciplines must come to a common agreement about the terms included, and has yet to be employed. Additionally, due to the public’s heavy reliance upon FP concepts, Franklin, Slors and Churchill all propose that there must be a gradual transition from old to new concepts, in which complete elimination would result in a lack of conceptual understanding.

Anderson mentions cognitive maps that are used to map various cognitive categories. In his opinion, the issue is that the FP categories currently being used are far too broad and cannot be localized in the brain due to the lack of specificity. Along with Franklin and Slors, he also believes that neuroscientists will struggle with localization due to neural degeneration.

Similar to Churchland, Anderson suggests that the concepts currently used in research may not be reflective of the brain’s native concepts, and should be reformulated using narrower starting concepts. Anderson believes that neuroscience has already begun to overcome this problem with the use of a Train Classifier, in which training with multiple different data sets learns the ability to predict associated cognitive concepts with experimental tasks. In his opinion, this method has shown a great deal of promise for the current issues that scientists face.

Before we proceed, we must also determine if its right to allow for the unfair advantage that neuroenhancement creates. As well, through unequal access to such costly procedures, those who do receive it may develop a new ‘normal’ standard for cognitive functioning, creating separations amongst class and feelings of disempowerment.

Similar to critiques mentioned thus far, Hamilton believes that neuroscientific progress makes this newly emerging form of treatment inevitable. In order to overcome such challenges, he believes that neuroscientists and physicians must work together when conjoining and administering neuro-enhancing treatments. As well, physicians must develop a close relationship with their patients to determine whether they truly require an additional aid.

In agreement with Slors, I believe that the solution to discontinuous conceptual breadth lies in the gradual elimination of CCCs. They don’t appear to serve any purpose and only continue to exist due to their long-standing history. Already being conceptually similar to the SCCs, learning to replace them with SCCs is likely to be accomplishable. I believe that we have shown a great deal of intellectual and technological evolution since the time when CCCs were first employed. If we are able to advance to the monumental level of understanding that we are at today, I believe that we are most likely capable of accomplishing this challenge as well.

To work on solving the issue of neural degeneration, I strongly support Anderson’s idea of a Train Classifier. For one, it allows for the combination and extrapolation of several data sets that I believe humans would be unable to accomplish alone. As well, the Train Classifier may serve to carry results from one study to the next, allowing for scientists to reach a greater productivity through the accumulation of results. During each translation, I believe that this technology will also serve as a non-biased method of analysis, preventing any biased interpretation. The Train Classifier is also beneficial such that one is not limited to a certain kind of stimulus or experimental task, rather, patterns can be found across many studies. Scientists can then employ several difference experiments, resulting in a highly diverse set of data to be worked with.

To address the misunderstandings of key terms, I suggest the development of an international communication platform and subsequent face to face collaboration. All professionals within a single discipline can first communicate amongst each other, coming to an agreement on the understanding of terms within their own field. This will help to establish a baseline. Several leaders from each field can then be selected, congregating together to explain the collective agreement of their represented profession. Statistical, technological, and language experts could also be included to provide further insight, mentioning that coming to an agreement will be challenging, which is why I suggest that there must be a promise of honest integrity and academic honour, resulting in greater collaboration.

Through the inclusion of several critiques in the current article, we addressed the relatedness of outdated folk psychological methods to those of the newly emerging neuroscience. We addressed the limitations of folk psychology and how, specifically, neuroscience is able to overcome each limitation. We mentioned several additional challenges that may arise as neuroscientists continue their research, and offered potential solutions to each challenge. Currently it remains unknown if neuroscience will be able to overcome each issue, however through the progressive advancements that they have recently shown, this discipline appears to offer a great deal of promise when discovering the unchartered territory of the mind to brain relationship.

~Nicole Addison

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Citations

Anderson, M. L. (2015). Mining the Brain for a New Taxonomy of the Mind. Philosophy Compass,10(1), 68-77. doi:10.1111/phc3.12155

Paul M. Churchland (1981) Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 2 pp. 67-90

Francken, J. C., & Slors, M. (2014). From common sense to science, and back: The use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience. Consciousness and Cognition, 29, 248-258. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.019