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The future of war

The war

By mslPublished 2 years ago 24 min read
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The future of war
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War is out of the European mind. In fact, it is receding, but many factors of conflict remain and war is adapting to the evolution of techniques (digitization, nanotechnology) as well as the ways of thinking (waging wars without victims, at a distance); Europe cannot pretend that violent conflicts are definitely a thing of the past.

France is passionate about war. Not the one that threatens the eastern marches of Europe, but that of 1914-1918. The centenary commemorations are an eloquent and somewhat paradoxical success, a few years after the death of the last "hairy". The cultural and media field, already wide open to the epic of the Resistance, the cornerstone of the national legend, is, more than ever, occupied by the armies in the field1. However, Western Europe has not experienced an armed conflict on its territory for nearly seventy years and the idea is spreading in people's minds that this truce, unique in the course of history, would be acquired forever. Also, the celebration of the victims and the heroes of these deadly confrontations appears as a form of exorcism, an ultimate tribute paid to the actors of a bygone past. The unanimous condemnation of human madness and unnecessary massacres is no longer accompanied by warnings for the future as if this form of collective violence no longer concerns us.

But what is war? Bruno Tertrais2, noting that the practice of declaring war was abandoned after 1945, defines it as "a large-scale armed conflict opposing at least two human groups", tribes, cities, states, alliances, religious or political groups. Can we reasonably hope that humanity, having reached the age of reason, will eliminate this scourge that has accompanied it since the beginning of time? The good news is that war is on the decline in people's minds and in practice. But the bad news is that she is adapting and her future is secure.

The war is actually on the decline

The statistics prove it. This ebb is recent but strongly marked: conflicts between states are becoming rare and their development is better controlled; civil wars remain frequent, but their number is also tending to decrease.

Since 1990 and the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts has decreased by almost 80%. Iraq in 2003 and Georgia in 2008 are the latest avatars of an old practice, that of interstate wars, which seems to be disappearing. The Ukrainian crisis does not, or at least not yet, fall into this category. Civil wars, for their part, often coupled with interventions by great powers mandated by the UN, are more visible in our globalized societies but they are becoming rarer.

This decline in war constitutes a major break in the history of humanity, where peace has always been the exception. The number of armed conflicts continued to increase until the end of the 20th century. However, not only is the trend now reversed, but these clashes are now better controlled. Admittedly, horror and barbarism are always present there, especially since the religious factor holds a privileged place, but the conflicts are shorter due to the increased power of weapons and the exorbitant cost of operations. They are also less lethal, at least for the fighters, better protected, and better cared for. Today, 90% of victims are civilians, but, here again, the ever-increasing precision of weapons tends to limit "blunders".Finally, the “information revolution” and the emergence of global governance impose a form of regulation that limits its development. The omnipresence of the media, Internet networks, and mobile phones generate minimum transparency which acts on public opinion and weighs on belligerents, limiting to a certain extent the extent of massacres and acts of cruelty.

At the same time, the “community of nations” exerts greater control over international violence. The United Nations Security Council (Csnu), the International Criminal Court, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflicts. And, in parallel, disarmament progresses (chemical weapons, anti-personnel mines, cluster weapons).

How to explain this rupture of 1990? There are multiple causes. The end of the East-West confrontation, by reactivating the United Nations Security Council, allowed the emergence of an outline of global governance. The completion of decolonization sealed the end of a historic cycle of conflict. The expansion of democracy constitutes a new brake on warlike adventures. Finally, the relative blurring of borders and the increased economic interdependence of states promote negotiation as a means of settling international disputes.

Two military factors also played in favor of peace: the durability of nuclear deterrence, whose inhibiting role was decisive during the Cold War, and the decline in the war can be seen in armament expenditure, which represented 6.7% of world GDP in 1985 and only constituted 2.6% in 20103. Beyond the figures, fleeting and debatable, the most striking for the European observer is the retreat of the war in people's minds.

The war recedes in the minds

At the beginning of the 19th century, inspired by Kant and supported by the commercial ardor of the physiocrats, the theory of the three waves of pacification was already contesting the inescapable nature of war. The first wave, according to its promoters4, was born of the Christianization which would have put an end to the ancient tradition of the Vae victims. limiting the rights and demands of the victors, it would have allowed for the establishment of lasting peace. The second wave, born of the expansion of trade, would tend to substitute the trader man for the warrior animal. Third-wave, finally, the advent of democracy gave hope that sovereign peoples would rise up against warmongers. As we know, this theory did not stand up to the sixty million deaths in the world wars of the following century.

It was only at the end of the Cold War that thinking about the eradication of armed conflict gained new momentum. In 1989, John Mueller5 was the first credible prophet of the end of the great state wars. Three new factors, according to him, combined to neutralize the belligerent ardor. First, the cost of war, increasingly prohibitive, would exceed the expected benefits of a military victory. The power of nations, moreover, would henceforth rest on their economic resources much more than on their military capabilities. Finally, in our evolved societies, traditional warrior values, such as honor, courage, or patriotism, would be outdated or even rejected.

After him, Joseph S. Nye, without neglecting military assets, developed the concept of soft power, according to which most conflicts can be prevented or resolved by economic incentives and pressures, diplomatic games, and cultural influences. . These reflections, taken up, commented on and expanded, met with great success in Western Europe, where the national idea was increasingly contested and war increasingly distant.

After him, Joseph S. Nye, without neglecting military assets, developed the concept of soft power, according to which most conflicts can be prevented or resolved by economic incentives and pressures, diplomatic games and cultural influences. . These reflections, taken up, commented on and expanded, met with great success in Western Europe, where the national idea was increasingly contested and war increasingly distant.

The construction of Europe and the relative loss of State sovereignty reinforce the repudiation of nationalisms deemed responsible for the wars of the 20th century. In intellectual circles and in the vulgate media, the rejection of war very quickly took on a new tone. Long perceived as an inevitable scourge, it is now denounced as an immoral act, even a bestial activity. This sensitivity, consecrated in France by several literary prizes, even casts doubt on the morality of the actors of armed conflicts, nowadays professional soldiers. We are far from the "nobility of the profession of arms" always celebrated by the bards. The reversal of values ​​is total when human life is erected as the supreme value, whereas for millennia the sovereign virtue has been the acceptance of sacrifice for the benefit of the community. Individualism and comfort find their account here. Peace too? Perhaps.

With the sharp decline in the number of conflicts, increased control of violence, and widespread rejection of war among opinion leaders in the Western world, should we conclude that interstate conflicts have died out?

And yet the war has a hard life. The traditional factors of armed violence remain and the strategic context does not encourage optimism. What is more, war is adapting to the new technological and societal situation.

One might think so by considering the weariness of public opinion with regard to the military interventions of the great powers, which are nevertheless most often endorsed by the “international community”. Even humanitarian interference, “war in the name of humanity6”, is no longer successful. The polls carried out in France are eloquent: opinions in favor of intervention before the start of the operations went from 68% for Bosnia to 51% for the Central African Republic and 32% for Syria. Last authorized version of the "just war", the intervention suffers from the poor political results obtained in Libya and from the vagueness attached to the notion of the "duty to protect", a pseudo-obligation without sanction or clear definition. How can we be surprised at the reluctance to any commitment in Syria, or even to any robust initiative to support Ukraine?

American historian Jay Winter noted last year:

War has lost its glory, its luster, and its legitimacy in the West. Going to war has ceased to be a political option in Western Europe.

And yet the war has a hard life. The traditional factors of armed violence remain and the strategic context does not encourage optimism. What is more, war is adapting to the new technological and societal situation.

The traditional factors of conflict remain

The cynicism and barbarism expressed in the words and deeds of the new champions of armed violence contrast sharply with the recent progress of humanity “towards perpetual peace” and the soothing speeches of Western thinkers. The monstrous "exploits" of Boko Haram, the campaigns of systematic rape in the Balkans and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the genocide in Rwanda and the series of massacres perpetrated in Sudan or the Central African Republic, the gassing of civilian populations in Syria and The interminable litany of attacks against civilian populations in Iraq, Pakistan or Afghanistan testifies to the maintenance at a high level of a form of blind violence fueled by religious ideology and delinquency. Faced with these new forms of expression of armed violence, diplomats and soldiers are struggling to find their bearings. The political negotiation gets bogged down there in the face of divided, fanatical, and unscrupulous interlocutors. Conventional armies get bogged down there, forced to measure the deployment of their power by international law and the vigilance of public opinion. The “hybridization” of war, to use Bastien Irondelle’s formula, mixing terrorism, criminality, and classic armed conflict, is a new challenge for Western powers and makes it difficult to achieve lasting peace. These outbursts of violence remind us that the traditional factors of war are still present. Starting with a man with his reptilian brain, his DNA almost unchanged since the prehistoric era, his fear of the Other and in particular of those who do not belong to his group, his clan, his tribe. Polemic studies highlight this general predisposition to aggression, which is more marked in young males. Sociology, for its part, has exposed the mechanisms of identity, demonstrating that maintaining the solidarity of a group frequently calls for the designation of an external enemy. Other belligerent factors are well known, such as the imbalance between demography and available resources. Authoritarian regimes have always exploited the potential for aggressiveness in our societies. Does this mean that, as we like to reassure ourselves, democracies do not wage war against each other? Let's not forget that it was the Weimar Republic that brought Hitler to power.

Basically, the traditional causes of war remain as they were defined by Thucydides, "fear, honor or interest", or by Raymond Aron, "security, glory or power". But very concretely, the strategic context does not encourage optimism.

The loss of sovereignty of nations is not offset by a real rise in the power of global governance. The proliferation of transnational actors (international organizations, multinational companies, finance, computer networks) weakens the role of States and curbs their capacity for action without, however, the "international community" satisfactorily assuming the functions of regulation and control formerly exercised by the imperial powers. International humanitarian law is flouted in Syria, Darfur, South Sudan, South Asia... The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is indeed experiencing a pause with the chemical disarmament of Syria and the negotiations initiated on Iranian nuclear power, but the work of the non-proliferation treaty is bogged down, and North Korea continues its tests and the “threshold countries” are more numerous. Who does not see, moreover, that the delegitimization of nuclear deterrence could have dramatic consequences in the regions of the world where it constitutes the only brake on bellicose ardor?

International crime and terrorism, often associated with ethnic or religious armed groups, rely on globalization to develop their networks. Deadly attacks, trafficking in drugs, arms, or human beings, piracy and illegal immigration networks are shaking developed countries, parasitizing international trade, and deeply destabilizing less advanced countries through corruption and violence.

These new imbalances are aggravated by the relative effacement of the United States. Tired of the failures of their interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Americans are turning away from Europe, displaying for the first time in their history a strategic priority for Asia, abandoning the Palestinian conflict, renouncing to intervene in Syria, and inventing leadership from behind, the guise of a neo-isolationism that leaves Europe an orphan and awakens appetites for power elsewhere. From a unipolar world, dominated since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact by the American hyperpower, we have moved to an apolar world, without direction or control. Emerging countries oppose Western initiatives in a dispersed order without asserting a clear line. Russian enterprises aimed at reconstituting the empire of the tsars, or even of the former USSR, can be deployed without risk, the European Union hiding in its pusillanimity and displaying its divisions.

The Middle East is more than ever a “powder keg”. The Palestinian conflict is at an impasse and the Sunni-Shiite confrontation is taking on worrying proportions, carrying the seeds of a major conflict in a region crucial for the energy supply of Europe and China. In South Asia, the Indo-Pakistani conflict, contained so far by nuclear deterrence, could flare up if the Pakistani state continues its slow disintegration. On the southern shore of the Mediterranean, the shock wave of the Arab revolutions has not yet produced all its effects but is helping to spread Islamist jihad in the Sahel. Sub-Saharan Africa, despite its economic takeoff, remains shaken by waves of ethnic and religious violence.

Finally, China, now the second-largest economic power in the world, displays an intransigent nationalism and its territorial claims are based on a considerable armament effort. In the medium term, a confrontation with the United States seems inevitable.

The risk of armed conflict, therefore, persists in a world where the “gendarmes” have given up and where the “thieves” seek to win the day. All hope of regenerating global governance is not lost, but we will have to act quickly because new risk factors are emerging. Demographic expansion, tensions over resources caused by the rapid development of emerging countries, and the consequences of global warming will soon give rise to new tensions. The former General Secretary of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali predicted twenty years ago that “the wars of the next century will be wars for water”.

War adapts to the evolution of techniques and minds

Decisive technical developments, those that have upset the art of war, have been few in number over the centuries: bows, gunpowder, and nuclear weapons8.

However, the progress of digitization combined with the exploitation of nanotechnology now makes it possible to envisage the fulfillment of an old dream, that of war conducted at home, without risk and without limitation of scope.

The information revolution, combined with advances in the precision of weapons and ranged shooting techniques, is already allowing greater mastery of the battlefield, limiting friendly losses and the number of civilian casualties. Thus the NATO airstrike campaign in Libya in 2011 was the least deadly in the history of bombing. This type of “clean war” satisfies Western public opinion: zero deaths here, very few innocent victims. But this development does not yet constitute a real break, military art having always valued the limitation of losses for oneself and for one's camp. Yet it makes war more palatable – therefore more tempting? The major inflection could come from the robotization of the battlefield and automated weapons. The first version is given to us by armed drones, intensively engaged by the United States for ten years. Land and naval robots are also being developed in several countries. Their use in conventional theaters of operations will reinforce the concept of “clean warfare” without revolutionizing the conduct of war. On the other hand, their use outside any framework approved by the United Nations opens a legitimate debate, although often biased by anti-Americanism in principle and ignorance of the evolution of armaments. Why, indeed, is a drone strike more reprehensible than firing missiles or aerial bombardments from a distance? It is therefore the use of these weapons outside an operational framework legitimized by the UN that poses a problem by contravening international law and undermining the sovereignty of States. It would still be necessary to prove that the States concerned (Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia) did not give a confidential agreement to these actions. The fact remains that these strikes, primarily targeting terrorist leaders, often resemble targeted assassinations. However, the execution without trial of individuals suspected of crimes is obviously contrary to human rights and questionable from an ethical point of view. The argument of the "lesser evil" (often put forward to defend torture: how many innocent lives are spared, etc.) is disputed by those who believe that "terror by the air" arouses more vocations than it disrupts networks. . The United States, therefore, supplements the action of the drones with specific interventions by special forces which target command posts and arms caches. A serious assessment of this “shadow war” is difficult to draw, but the indefinite extension of this discreet and inexpensive financially and politically costly strategy authorizes a certain skepticism.

Another debate concerns automated weapons that could equip drones and future robots in the near future. Equipped with powerful software, these weapons should take on the detection, identification, and destruction of suspected adversaries without human control. Undoubtedly less blind than the mines laid at the crossroads (but whose use is prohibited or limited), they raise legitimate questions. If they cause civilian casualties, who is responsible? The soldier who placed them, the head of state who ordered their use, or the software manufacturer? The irruption of the “intelligent robot” in the art of war calls for a rigorous framework of international law and control measures. In any case, we see or will see the advent of the “post-heroic” war predicted by Edward Luttwak9 materialize. For millennia, military honor was based on the combatant's acceptance of the supreme risk for himself, legitimizing the exorbitant right given to him to kill the adversary if the mission required it. In robotic warfare, operators will have to redefine a conception of honor, otherwise, they would be nothing more than technicians of death.

Make no mistake about it, this evolution will only concern a limited number of nations, the others having to be content with traditional means, for lack of financial and technological resources. Nothing new, it will be said, since the colonial wars the asymmetry between the great powers and the others have been the rule, even if the average level of armaments implemented by the belligerents of the less favored nations has not stopped increasing. But the recent evolution of the arsenals is not without consequence on the capacities and the modes of action of the powerful. The exponential increase in the cost of armaments leads, in developed countries, to a constant reduction in formats and manpower, laminating land forces and drastically limiting the number of planes and ships. Consequently, faced with the imperative of military intervention, the leaders of these countries have no other choice but to opt for a "power projection", associating air and naval platforms with the assistance of special forces, in short-term actions, hoping to hand over to international forces supplied by the land forces of less advanced countries. Operations such as those conducted in the Balkans, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, or the Central African Republic will soon no longer be within their reach unless massive recourse is had to private military companies, which poses other problems of control and legitimacy. We can clearly see the political advantages of interventions in the “hit and forget” mode: low risk of getting bogged down, very limited friendly losses, and no occupation of the ground. But, since the “success” of 2011 in Libya, we can measure the limits. It is not enough to win the war, you must also win the peace.

Another consequence of the digitization of our societies is the opening up of a new field of action for belligerents, cyberspace. Cyberwar, a confrontation without deaths if not without victims, goes far beyond the military framework but can hardly, on its own, guarantee a decisive victory. A sneaky weapon, the aggressor remaining anonymous, it is promised a bright future and is already an important supporting element in classic conflicts. Its use nevertheless remains tricky, as the response can be formidable due to the cross-vulnerabilities of the protagonists and the growing weight of international actors. The Nsa wiretapping scandal has highlighted, in this area, the ambiguity of the permanent action of the intelligence services, serving both the economic interests and the security needs of their country and lending a hand to a form of controlling populations in the name of the fight against terrorism. Mastering cyberspace is becoming a major concern for the security of our societies, but also for democracy.

Beyond computer networks, outer space itself could once again become an issue. The treaty10 which prohibits its militarization could be circumvented by the development of anti-satellite weapons. A new Pandora's box would then be opened.

The nagging question that pursues the strategists and affects the staff is naturally that of the adequacy of this evolution of the art of war with the emergence of the "ill-defined games of violence"11 which characterize the crises of this beginning of the century. Certainly, in the short term, one can hope that nuclear deterrence, the military superiority of the United States, and global governance, or what takes their place, will continue to slow down the development of interstate conflicts. But on the other front, that of anomic hybrid violence, questions remain. Since the end of the Cold War, the settlement of crises and conflicts under the aegis of the United Nations has been assumed, for the most part, by Western military powers. However, the evolution of their arsenals and their tactical plans, and the priority given to "zero deaths" direct them towards a strategy of "coups de main" (projection of power, robots, and special forces) which makes it possible to temporarily neutralize the troublemakers. , but do not leave the diplomatic, legal, police, and economic field the time or the means to deploy. But how to fight against the hybridization of terrorism, crime, and ethnic hatred without an effort of global action that requires presence and perseverance? The evolution of the art of war reflects in its own way the impatience of our societies for the immediate. We then pretend to believe that the UN peacekeeping missions will make up for these weaknesses, but the Blue Helmets will never have the license, the means, or the will to impose their law on our new Barbarians.

And Europe?

We must think and act [said Raymond Aron] with the firm intention that the absence of war continues until the day when peace becomes possible, assuming that it ever does.

In Western Europe, after a long period of peace, war is rejected and condemned. The warlike are stricken with opprobrium and summoned to justify themselves by law and morality. This ethical turning point could have been decisive for the destiny of humanity if the Europeans had kept the power to rule the world that was theirs for a time, but their ability to set the standards and impose the rules of the game vanished. for decades. And, at the very time when European states are dramatically reducing their military spending, emerging countries are modernizing their arsenals and global armament spending is taking on new momentum. How not to wonder, with Hubert Védrine, about the strategic lethargy that grips our old continent? Is Europe not in the process of leaving the course of history by abandoning the reins of its destiny to power, the United States, which is itself tired of this burden? And who does not see that this temptation to withdraw from the Western world leaves the field open to imperial ambitions, from Ukraine to the Spratly Islands, and encourages the criminal games of the sowers of hatred and violence? The war will find its account there.

The unbearable images of violence poured onto our screens by the retrospective documentaries of 14-18 are a healthy appeal to reason. But let's be clear:

If the illusion of the end of the war recurs so regularly, it is due to the excessive rationalization of an activity that draws its strength from a source much more powerful than human reason12.

The Evolution of Global Military Budgets

the overall decrease in budgets

Two observations emerge clearly for the 2013-2014 period: on the one hand, state expenditure intended for the areas of defense, security and prevention is down on a global scale; on the other hand, the “traditional” major strategic actors – NATO member countries – are gradually in a position of withdrawal, to the benefit of emerging countries which are rapidly increasing their military investments.

The first element raised by various reports1 is the indisputable reduction in defense expenditure: "In 2013, world defense expenditure, calculated from 77 countries, was 1.530 billion dollars, or 7% less than in 20092.” Nevertheless, in 2014, the trend reversed for the first time in the last five years. We recorded an increase of 0.6% thanks to the dynamism of emerging countries3.

A new global balance?

According to detailed figures from Ihs Jane published in February 2014, a new configuration of the world military order would gradually take shape, the effects of which would be felt from 2017 to 2018.

In fact, from 2012, the poles of military power were modified by the arrival in the second position in the ranking of Asia, notably driven by major Chinese investments, thus marking a considerable break in the global defense balance. Since the 1980s, the first two military powers have been Western. For 2013, the United States remains first (with a budget of 577 billion dollars, and 582 billion planned for 2014), Asia comes second (341.6 billion dollars, including 131 billion of investments for China alone) and the European Union third (just over 234 billion dollars).

The new global governance provided for by the Ihs report is therefore partly dependent on the policies of military withdrawal announced since the 2008 crisis in NATO countries. While the United States remained largely in the lead in 2013, accounting for 39% of global military expenditure, its hegemonic position in the area of ​​defense and security is gradually being offset by the reduction in military investment foreseen by the American agenda: in 2017, these should fall below the 36% mark (compared to 47% in 2008). The same is true for the major European military powers, whose spending is falling year after year: in the case of France, spending fell from 62.7 billion dollars in 2011 to 58.7 billion dollars in 2012 and is expected to decline further by 2019.

The second element to note is the increase in spending by governments outside NATO. Thus the Asian, Russian, sub-Saharan regions, and also the Mena countries (the Middle East and North Africa) have increased (sometimes even doubled) their military investments since the beginning of the 2000s: the example of Asia is undoubtedly the most eloquent (it represented 17% of global military investments in 2008, 22% in 2013 and would represent 24% in 2017 according to forecasts). On a smaller scale, some states have in the space of a few years provided their defense with a considerable budget, going as far as tripling the investments. Still, according to figures from the Ihs, Saudi Arabia has increased its military budget by 13.7% on average per year over the past ten years (to arrive at a budget of nearly $67 billion today).

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