Hanna Rassamakhina on Ukraine’s Judicial System, Corruption Reform, and War Crimes Accountability

Hanna Rassamakhina is a Ukrainian lawyer, attorney, and international humanitarian law expert serving as Head of the War and Justice Department at the Media Initiative for Human Rights. She leads trial monitoring on war crimes and national security cases, focusing on accountability for crimes committed during Russia's aggression against Ukraine. A graduate of Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University, she has worked in human rights protection since 2014, including at the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Hanna Rassamakhina discuss how Russia’s full-scale invasion reshaped trust in Ukraine’s judicial system. Rassamakhina argues that while corruption still exists, post-2014 reforms and wartime accountability work have made courts more transparent and war-crimes proceedings comparatively resistant to corruption. The conversation contrasts Ukraine’s anti-corruption trajectory with Russia’s decline on Transparency International’s index, while stressing that public trust has risen most clearly around investigations and prosecutions related to war crimes in Ukraine today.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Did the war reduce the number of legal professionals in the country? Did people leave because of the threat, and did that affect the national judicial system?

Hanna Rassamakhina: Yes, certainly. It affected it. It is an interesting issue.

Before 2014, before the Revolution of Dignity, a professional judge was often associated with corruption. The same perception could apply to prosecutors and advocates. The system changed significantly after 2014.

After the full-scale invasion, one can say that the authority of the system increased. I am trying to find the right word, more transparent.

Jacobsen: What about now? There is a nuanced part to that. There are prosecutors, judges, and lawyers. Were all three sectors impacted, or were some impacted more than others by the evacuation of qualified professionals?

Rassamakhina: The word I was looking for is “trust.” Yes, citizens of Ukraine trust the court system and investigators more. If we distinguish between prosecutors, investigators, and judges, I do not have enough information to say definitively how attitudes toward each of these parts of the system have changed in the last four years.

It may be possible to assess this through social science research. I do not have enough information, but in general, one can say that trust in the system has increased significantly, particularly in the context of war crimes.

Jacobsen: Regarding the earlier remark about lawyers before the Revolution of Dignity, I would ask that this not be included in the final version. We can keep this academic by referring to third-party, non-Russian, non-Ukrainian international sources.

For example, the Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International, which measures perceived public-sector corruption rather than corruption in an absolute sense. In 2022, Ukraine scored 33 out of 100 and ranked 116th out of 180 countries, while Russia scored 28 and ranked 137th out of 180. In 2025, Ukraine scored 36 and ranked 104th out of 182 countries, while Russia scored 22 and ranked 157th out of 182. On that measure, Russia is perceived as significantly more corrupt than Ukraine.

At the same time, Ukraine has made documented efforts to reduce corruption, and its CPI score improved from 33 in 2022 to 36 in 2025. Russia, by contrast, declined from 28 in 2022 to 22 in 2025. So it is accurate to say that Ukraine has improved somewhat over time, while Russia has deteriorated on this index.

Within the legal profession, prosecutors, lawyers, and judges, this broader anti-corruption context is relevant, though the CPI itself does not measure those professions separately.

Jacobsen: What subtle changes do we observe at the national level of the judicial system with reductions in corruption, even if levels remain relatively high? For instance, does public perception change? Does trust in institutions change? Do practices change?

Rassamakhina: Sorry, do you mean in Ukraine or in the Russian Federation?

Jacobsen: I mean Ukraine as the main focus, but also as a comparative example with the aggressor state. It is important to comment on that as well. For example, if you look at women’s rights, they have improved more in Ukraine compared to the Russian Federation.

If you look at the Press Freedom Index from Reporters Without Borders, Ukraine ranks significantly higher than Russia. In recent rankings, Ukraine is placed in the mid-range globally, while the Russian Federation ranks near the bottom out of 180 countries. I am using your expertise and this example, along with law and the Corruption Perceptions Index, to build a factual narrative grounded in third-party analysis of how the two societies have been diverging during the war.

Rassamakhina: Yes, I understand what you mean. First, if we speak about corruption and anti-corruption in Ukraine, I do not have specialized expertise in this area. It is a separate and complex field, and I do not work directly in it.

I can speak from my experience as a lawyer. During the years after the Revolution of Dignity, social practices in the court system have changed significantly.

Before 2014, corruption could function almost like a service. If someone wanted to participate in corrupt practices, they could pay money and face little immediate risk.

Now, it is not a stable or accepted social practice. Corruption still exists, but it carries real risks for those involved. I say this as a private person observing the system from within.

If we speak about war crimes proceedings, in my view they are largely free from corruption. The reason is straightforward: there is no space for corruption to operate. There are no stakeholders who could benefit from it.

Those who committed these crimes are not participants in the trials. They are absent and have no involvement in the process. The other participants, victims, judges, investigators, and prosecutors, share a common interest: achieving accountability for those responsible for war crimes.

Because of this alignment of interests, this sphere is, in my view, free from corruption.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Hanna.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a blogger on Vocal with more than 200 publications on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978–1–0692343; 978–1–0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369–6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018–7399; Online: ISSN, 2163–3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719–6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The Good Men Project, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing, comprising more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications across more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20–0708028), and others.