India’s maritime history and engagement with the Indian Ocean region

The smallest of the Indian military services, the Indian Navy has carved a unique position in the national security framework. It has significantly raised its profile internationally. However, India's "maritime awareness" is at its most nascent stage, and every care and attention must be accorded, considering the deficiency of strategic vision that the political bureaucratic elites possess. The coalition of geopolitics, economy, and demography is certain to impose further obligations on the Indian subcontinent.

Indian maritime trade dates back to the third millennium BCE, with the Indus Valley civilisation trading with Mesopotamia. India's extensive coastline, formed by the Deccan Plateau, has facilitated commercial ties with Europeans, particularly the Greeks, and has given the Indian Ocean its name. The discovery of a dry dock in Lothal, considered the world’s oldest ship repair facility, highlights early maritime practices. During British rule, the Indian Navy emerged with the Bombay Marine and Bengal Marine bases in Mumbai and Kolkata. Following independence, it split into the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Pakistan Navy. On April 22, 1958, Vice Admiral R. D. Katari became the first Indian to serve as Chief of Staff of the Indian Navy. New Delhi's location reinforces its role in shaping India's growing influence and foreign policy in the Indian Ocean region.

India occupies a unique geographic position in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region. Thus, as India emerges from the constraints of South Asia and gains international recognition as a sovereign nation, it seeks to recast itself in a wider and more dynamic environment to transform its evolving character, including its expanding influence in the Indian Ocean area.

This is also a response to the growing dependence of the nation on sea routes for commerce. India has also been rapidly expanding its diplomatic influence abroad through the use of its naval assets, particularly to shape the strategic environment in and around the Indian Ocean. India chose to establish its Far Eastern Command on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal in an attempt to impede China's expansion into the region via the Strait of Malacca, the primary chokepoint for oil supply to China. It contains an air force station, a navy weapons depot, missile silos, and Karwar, which happens to be India's third operational naval facility on the western part of the country. The Seabird Project aims to protect the nation's maritime routes in the Arabian Sea. India's efforts to recast its status as more than just a South Asian power and the need for stability for India's economic advancement have made avoiding any separation of the Indian Ocean area its top priority, and it is likely to remain so. One method to do this is to reject overtures from outside parties that may raise security concerns in a place where none existed before.

The nature of civil-military relations in India and some internal bureaucratic obstacles, such as inadequate liaison between the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs, occasionally hinder the Indian Navy's efforts to broaden the scope of bilateral engagement. Military officials in the Ministry of Defence have limited powers to establish mechanisms for cooperation within the framework laid down by their civilian counterparts, and they cannot overstep these boundaries. Furthermore, even the deployment of the Navy as a diplomatic tool has emerged as valuable for the Ministry of External Affairs only now with the adoption of a maritime perspective; it is hence only beginning to develop coordination with naval leaders, but not much institutional progress has been achieved. Overcoming these historical inefficiencies requires progressive civilian leadership in the Ministry of Defence that would, over time, grant more autonomy to military personnel.