Diminishing returns: On India and its Shanghai Cooperation Organisation engagement

Diminishing returns: On India and its Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

engagement

India benefitted as a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, but the future is not bright

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation-Council of Heads of State meeting, hosted by Prime Minister

Narendra Modi on Tuesday, marked the first time India chaired the summit of regional countries.

India became a full SCO member in 2017, along with Pakistan. The government has held that joining

the originally Eurasian group was important as member-countries make up a third of the global GDP,

a fifth of global trade, a fifth of global oil reserves and about 44% of natural gas reserves. Also

important is its focus on regional security and connectivity — areas key to India’s growth and making

up its challenges, such as terrorism in Pakistan, and Chinese aggressions as well as the Belt and Road

Initiative. Being “inside the tent” is important, especially as Pakistan is a member, even if that means

conducting joint exercises under the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. The SCO also gives India

an interface with Central Asian markets and resources. Finally, joining the SCO was a key part of

India’s stated ambitions on “multi-alignment” and “strategic autonomy” while becoming a

“balancing power” in the world, and it seems no coincidence that the Modi government joined the

revived Quad with the U.S., Japan and Australia in the same year that it took up the full SCO

membership. Over the past year, this has become an economic necessity as India has chosen to be

neutral on the Ukraine war, benefiting from fuel and fertilizer purchases from Russia.

Therefore, it was expected that India’s turn to chair the SCO this year would be a major event,

rivalling the expected pomp around the G-20 meet in September. In addition, given Russia’s and

China’s blocks on the G-20 joint communiqué that India is keen to find consensus on, the SCO summit

would have been a convenient venue for Mr. Modi to negotiate a resolution with his counterparts.

However, India’s decision to postpone the SCO summit due to the Prime Minister’s U.S. State visit,

and then to turn it into a virtual summit may have been a dampener on the SCO outcomes. India’s

concerns with hosting Xi Jinping given the LAC hostilities, or Pakistan Prime Minister Sharif’s possible

‘grandstanding’, or even the optics of welcoming Russian President Vladimir Putin may have been

factors. Whatever the reason, while the members hammered out a New Delhi declaration and joint

statements on radicalisation and digital transformation, the government was unable to forge

consensus on other agreements including one on making English a formal SCO language, while India,

despite being Chair, did not endorse a road map on economic cooperation, presumably due to

concerns over China’s imprint. With its SCO chairpersonship ending, the government may now be

feeling the law of diminishing returns over its SCO engagement — one that might make its task of

hosting the G-20 even more difficult.

Summary of the Editorial

1. The editorial discusses India's engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),

noting that while India has benefited from being a member, the future appears uncertain.

2. India became a full member of the SCO in 2017 along with Pakistan, an originally Eurasian

group that consists of countries making up one-third of the global GDP, a fifth of global trade,

and significant portions of global oil and natural gas reserves.

3. The SCO's focus on regional security and connectivity is significant to India, providing a

platform for addressing key challenges such as terrorism and Chinese aggressions.

4. Membership to the SCO also grants India access to Central Asian markets and resources.

5. India's engagement with the SCO aligns with its ambition for multi-alignment, strategic

autonomy, and becoming a balancing power in the world.

6. India's neutrality on the Ukraine war allowed for beneficial fuel and fertilizer purchases from

Russia.

7. The meeting chaired by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was expected to be significant,

possibly rivalling the G-20 meet scheduled for September.

8. India hoped to use the SCO summit to negotiate a resolution on the G-20 joint communiqué,

which Russia and China have blocked.

9. However, the decision to postpone the SCO summit due to Modi's U.S. State visit, and later

make it virtual, possibly dampened the impact of the summit.

10. Concerns about hosting Chinese President Xi Jinping amidst border tensions, or potential

political posturing from Pakistan's Prime Minister, may have influenced the decision to hold a

virtual summit.

11. While a New Delhi declaration and joint statements on radicalisation and digital

transformation were agreed upon, consensus on other agreements was not achieved.

12. India, despite chairing the SCO, did not endorse a road map on economic cooperation,

potentially due to concerns over China's influence.

13. An agreement on making English a formal SCO language did not come to fruition.

14. As India's chairpersonship of the SCO comes to an end, the government may be experiencing

diminishing returns on its engagement with the organization.

15. The editorial concludes by suggesting that the challenges faced during India's SCO engagement

might complicate its upcoming task of hosting the G-20 summit.