01 logo

Apple’s Record Year Has a Cracked Screen

Tim Cook’s successor posted the best numbers in Apple history. His first big product launch is still failing the completion test.

By JinPublished about 21 hours ago • 12 min read

1. Two verdicts, one question

On Day 100 after taking over, Ternus received two verdicts.

One was written in the earnings report. The quarterly results released on Nov. 2 showed that in the three months ended Sept. 26, Apple recorded revenue of $114.477 billion, up 11.7% year over year. Net income was $30.711 billion, up 11.8%. Services revenue reached $31.573 billion, up 9.8%, a record high. iPhone contributed $57.583 billion, up 17.5%. Mac grew 23.7% to $10.792 billion. iPad revenue was $6.229 billion, down 10.4%. Wearables and home accessories were $8.3 billion, down 7.9%. Gross margin was 47.9%, about 1 percentage point of which came from tariff refunds.

For the full year, revenue was $478.834 billion, up 15.1%. Net income was $132.175 billion, up 18%. Both were the highest since the company was founded. Greater China grew 28% for the full year, ranking first among major markets. The active installed base of devices in mainland China and iPhone upgrade users both set records.

This earnings report was almost flawless. The only detail one could pick at was that Greater China’s 21% growth in the fourth quarter came in slightly below Wall Street’s prior expectation. Against $478.834 billion in annual revenue and 18% profit growth, that detail was a footnote.

The other verdict was written on social media. iPhone Duo went on sale in late October at a price above $2,000. It was the biggest form-factor change in the nearly 20 years since the iPhone debuted, and it put Apple a full seven years behind Samsung’s first foldable. Within days of launch, reports of cracked inner screens began appearing. The company confirmed that a small number of units had abnormal inner displays and advised users to seek replacements through after-sales channels. On Nov. 3, after the earnings call, Ternus faced the question for the first time. He said the share of units returned because of display issues was very small, and affected users were being given replacements one by one.

Failure rate, number of returned units, and batch inspection conclusions were not disclosed. “A very small share” is an unverifiable qualitative line. The product was not pulled from sale. There was no recall. The handling was one-for-one replacement for broken units. Outside speculation pointed to hinge assembly tolerance rather than a flaw in the overall design. In two and a half weeks on sale, 270,000 units were sold worldwide. One research firm expects the device to sell 5 million units in 2026 and capture 24.8% of the global foldable phone market. Whether that happens depends on whether consumers accept the “very small share” line.

The two verdicts are not contradictory. The earnings report proves that Cook-era operating compounding is still working: supply chain, services revenue, premium pricing, upgrade cycles. Crackgate exposed the first product test of the Ternus era. When Apple decides to redefine a product, can it first get that product right?

When he took over from Cook on Sept. 1, the outside world hoped for Jobs-style reinvention. By Day 100, the question had changed. The first job in reinvention is to get the product you defined right.

2. The best fiscal year is a buffer and a cover

This fiscal year gave Ternus a large buffer.

$478.834 billion in revenue and 18% profit growth show that the core business is untouched. iPhone 18 Pro’s strategy of shrinking the lineup and raising specs pushed up per-unit value. Greater China’s 28% growth showed that premium demand had not left. Services revenue of $31.573 billion in the quarter continued to act as a profit stabilizer. Mac grew 23.7%, the strongest growth source across the lineup. iPad and wearables declined, but not enough to change the overall picture.

With those numbers as a floor, Crackgate is a bearable product incident. It is not a strategic crisis.

But the cover will run out.

This fiscal year proves that Cook’s legacy can still fight. It does not prove that Ternus-style reinvention works. In Cook’s later years, financials rose year after year while products were judged as small-step, fast-iteration work: one change a year, changing specs, changing colors, changing camera layout. What held up $400 billion-scale revenue was operating efficiency, supply chain management, and the compounding of services. No recent generation made eyes light up. The cost was a thinner new-product pipeline and a seven-year absence from foldables.

Ternus took over with the expectation that he would return to the era of defining phones and defining tablets. No iteration. Reinvention.

The moves came fast. At his first launch event, he put iPhone Duo on stage with the posture of redefining foldables. The touch foldable laptop MacBook Fold was put on his high-priority list, aiming at the right to define the next category. The problem is simple. The stronger the reinvention posture, the lower the margin for error on completion quality. You cannot say, “We refuse to deliver something cheap and shoddy,” while users hit a cracked inner screen days after launch.

This is the central awkwardness of Ternus’s Day 100. The better the earnings, the more Crackgate is a thorn. The higher the posture, the more glaring the completion problem.

3. Crackgate is a completion crisis

Crackgate needs to be placed correctly.

The product was not pulled from sale. There was no recall. The share of returned units was described by the company as very small. The handling was replacement one by one. Commercially, this looks more like a batch- or assembly-level product incident than an overall failure of the foldable route. Outside speculation points to hinge assembly tolerance rather than an overall design flaw, which fits the “fixable” judgment.

It is still a completion crisis and a communication crisis.

Apple’s past strength was not “no problems.” It was that when problems arose, Apple could explain them clearly in engineering language. Ternus is an engineer by background, with 25 years at Apple. He worked on the original iPad, led Apple’s in-house M-series chips, and was a main driver behind the engineering execution of the iPhone 17 series. His line was very much that of an engineer: he never thought about putting technology directly in front of users; he thought about how to use technology to make good things.

That makes the current handling worse. Crackgate should not remain stuck for long at a qualitative line like “a very small share.” What is the failure rate? How many units were returned? What were the batch inspection conclusions? Is it an isolated batch problem or an assembly tolerance problem? If these questions are not answered, they will become an unavoidable question on every quarterly call. The less Apple quantifies, the more the outside world will quantify in its own way. Cracked-screen posts on social media, feedback from repair channels, and 270,000 units sold in two and a half weeks will all become substitute evidence.

“One-for-one replacement for broken units” can hold at the after-sales level. It is not enough at the brand level. Foldables are a category Apple entered seven years late. Users’ expectation is not “if it breaks, it can be replaced.” It is “if Apple makes it, it should be more reliable than others.” This is the standard Apple set for itself, not one imposed by outsiders.

Ternus explained why Apple was seven years late. He said it was not because Apple could not make one, but because it refused to deliver something cheap and shoddy. It preferred to first grind through a flat inner screen and a durable hinge. That line is close to Jobs. Jobs set quality standards for a category. He did not rush timing.

But Jobs had another half. The precondition for setting a standard is that the product itself is first flawless.

iPhone, iPad, and MacBook Air were the three definitional launches. They shared one thing. At the moment of launch, the level of completion already outweighed all doubts. When users saw the real thing, they found it better than the rumors. He made launch events into rituals. The precondition was that he did not shift engineering risk onto users.

Duo cracking days after launch proves that it failed the standard before it set the standard. That is more damaging than entering seven years late. Being late can be explained as caution. Cracking will be interpreted as: after seven years of caution, it still had not gotten the hinge and screen right. The foldable category itself is also losing steam. Since the first product in 2019, none of the three problems, crease, weight, and repair cost, has been solved. Apple entering now should have reaped every advantage. Technology had matured one round. The supply chain had cut costs one round. Consumer education had been done by others. Precisely because the timing was so smooth, the cracking is especially glaring. It happened where Apple could least afford to fail.

4. MacBook Fold: damage control or roadmap collapse

At the same time as Crackgate, MacBook Fold was killed.

The foldable laptop, originally planned to debut at year-end, was killed internally within Ternus’s first 100 days, while the cracked-screen controversy was at its height. Both readings make sense.

One is damage control. The screen and hinge problems exposed by Duo would only be more dangerous on a laptop. A laptop’s opening-and-closing frequency, load-bearing, screen area, and repair cost are all higher than a phone’s. The engineering risk of a foldable form factor does not increase linearly. It multiplies. The Mac line grew 23.7% in the fourth quarter, the strongest growth source across the lineup. There was no need to trade reputation for an unproven form factor. Killing it was classic engineer-style risk control. Protect the already-proven high-growth business first, then solve foldable reliability.

The other is roadmap collapse. A touch foldable laptop would be MacBook’s first form-factor transformation in more than a decade. Kill it, and Apple’s laptop schedule falls back to where it was. More important, it will make outsiders suspect that Apple is not choosing not to do it. They will suspect Apple is not doing it because it cannot do it well. For a company expected to reinvent, that suspicion is more damaging than a product delay.

Which is closer to the truth depends on how fast Apple can produce an alternative.

If MacBook Fold was only delayed, and Apple can deliver a higher-completion foldable laptop plan in the next 12 to 18 months, then the cancellation is damage control. Ternus traded one product withdrawal for a steadier launch. If the alternative does not appear for a long time, or if Apple falls back to the old path of annual chip, port, and screen tweaks on laptops, then the cancellation will be redefined as roadmap collapse.

There is an easily overlooked signal here. Ternus’s ambition is not a single product. It is category definition rights. iPhone Duo targets foldable phones. MacBook Fold targets foldable laptops. AI smart glasses and a screen-equipped home hub are queued behind. These products share the same set of capabilities: screen, hinge, thermal, battery, interaction, AI. Duo’s cracking is not one phone’s problem. It will transmit confidence to the upstream supply chain and downstream product lines. Killing MacBook Fold is short-term damage control. Whether long term it can become “fix capabilities first, then ship products” is the key.

5. The other half of Jobs: don’t shift engineering risk onto users

The comparison Ternus faces is not “like Cook or not.” It is “like Jobs or not.”

The memory of Jobs often stops at “reinvent.” iPhone reinvented the phone. iPad redefined the tablet. MacBook Air redefined thin-and-light. Jobs’s methodology had another half. The precondition for reinvention is that the product in users’ hands is flawless.

Apple products have not been problem-free. Antennagate, Bendgate, and Keyboardgate all happened. Jobs-era handling had one thing in common. After a problem appeared, Apple closed it with clear technical explanations and explicit service plans. It did not leave qualitative rhetoric hanging in the air. When a definitional product launched, completion had to outweigh doubt. Users can accept a product with tradeoffs. They cannot accept a product that fails on basic reliability.

Ternus is an engineer. He should understand this better than anyone. Engineering culture is not “never make mistakes.” It is “after a mistake, can locate, quantify, repair, and verify.” What Crackgate lacks is not after-sales action. It lacks engineering language: failure rate, root cause, batch range, fix plan, verification results. This information need not all be public. It must be released rhythmically so the market believes the problem is converging, not spreading.

Reinvention is not the posture at a launch event. It is the certainty in users’ hands after launch. Why should users believe Apple can establish the standard on its first try with AI glasses? Why should they believe a screen-equipped home hub will not become another “one-for-one replacement for broken units”? The answer will not come from $478.834 billion. It will come from Duo’s failure rate and sales over the next few quarters.

6. Foldables are losing steam; coming late is not automatically an advantage

The foldable industry itself is losing steam.

Since the first foldable product appeared in 2019, the category has remained in the hands of a few players. None of the three problems, crease, weight, and repair cost, has been completely solved. Early players educated the market and exposed the problems. The supply chain matured one round. Costs came down one round. Entering now, Apple theoretically has every late-mover advantage. It does not need to race to be first. It does not need to bear early trial and error. It can directly use a more mature supply chain to make a higher-completion product.

Late-mover advantage has a precondition. The late mover must actually make a more mature product. If the late mover is seven years late and the product still cracks days after launch, then being late is no longer caution. It is sluggishness. It is no longer “not rushing.” It is “failing to use the time well.”

Duo is priced above $2,000. Its positioning is not volume. It is standard-setting. Opening sales of 270,000 units are not a disaster, nor are they strong. The research firm’s forecast of 5 million units in 2026 and 24.8% global foldable share has a precondition. Crackgate must be quickly controlled and reputation must not spread. If “a very small share” remains unverifiable for long, then 5 million units and 24.8% will turn from benchmark into burden. With every unit sold, users will ask, “Will it crack?”

Foldable competition has moved from “who made it first” to “who can make users forget it is a foldable.” The crease must be invisible. Weight must approach a slab phone. Repair cost must be acceptable. Reliability must withstand daily opening and closing. Apple was once best at hiding new technology inside a good experience. Duo’s cracking is glaring precisely because it happened where that capability should be strongest.

7. After Day 100: three things to watch

Day 100 is just a node. Ternus’s main test is in the next four quarters.

First, watch Crackgate’s quantified disclosure. If failure rate and returned units remain qualitative for long, they will become an unavoidable question on every quarterly call. Ternus needs to establish a credible communication rhythm. When will he give the root cause? When will he give the fix plan? When will he give verification data? His engineer background is an advantage. He should use engineering language, not PR language, to solve the problem. Quantified disclosure is not exposing weakness. It is taking back interpretive authority.

Then watch Duo’s sales delivery. With 270,000 units at opening, the 5 million-unit and 24.8% share forecast will be decided by mid-next year. If Duo can stabilize its reputation after Crackgate and bring up upgrade users and service revenue, it will be the first cornerstone of Ternus’s “redefining foldables” claim. If sales miss, Apple will have to answer a sharper question. Seven years late, priced above $2,000, cracking at launch. What exactly did this product prove?

Finally, watch the pace of Siri AI monetization. CFO Parekh has warned that after Siri’s AI capabilities open to more users, cloud spending and revenue deferral will drag on short-term gross margin. Long term, they could drive upgrades and service revenue. Cloud spending pressing down gross margin is a short-term cost. Whether that cost can be recovered from service revenue determines the persuasiveness of Apple’s AI narrative. Apple is not the first company to do AI. It is the company that most needs to hide AI inside the experience. If Siri AI is merely “usable,” it is not enough to support reinvention. It must become a reason to upgrade and an engine for service revenue growth. Only then does it count as delivered.

Behind all three is the same question. Can Ternus convert the posture of reinvention into the credibility of completion?

8. Get it right first, then reinvent

Ternus’s ambition is understandable. A 25-year Apple career, the original iPad, M-series chips, and engineering execution on the iPhone 17 series give him enough of an engineering resume to support the ambition to define products. Jobs’s resolve to press a product to flawlessness must be earned back one product at a time.

This best-ever fiscal year is both a buffer and a cover. $478.834 billion in revenue and 18% profit growth show that the core business is untouched. Crackgate is a bearable product incident. But the cover will run out. The AI smart glasses and screen-equipped home hub queued behind must answer the same question. Why should users believe Apple can establish the standard on its first try?

Watch three numbers: Duo’s failure rate, its sales pace, and the speed of a MacBook Fold alternative. Those will decide whether Ternus’s reinvention talk turns into completion credit.

On Day 100, Ternus delivered half the answer in the earnings. The other half is still inside Crackgate.

tech newsfact or fictionthought leadersapps

About the Creator

Jin

Writer of reamstories

https://reamstories.com/jin

Enjoyed the story? Support the Creator.

Subscribe for free to receive all their stories in your feed. You could also become a paid subscriber, letting them know you appreciate their work.

Subscribe For Free

Reader insights

Comments

There are no comments for this story

Be the first to respond and start the conversation.

Sign in to comment
    Written by Jin