Worst plans: the next stage of the Russian war in Ukraine

On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the launch of a "special military operation" in the sovereign territory of Ukraine. Although he said that Russian military action would serve to protect the Ukrainian people from "genocide" by "genocide", the operation amounted to a full-scale invasion of the country. While some military and intelligence analysts, especially those with access to the Kremlin, predicted that Kyiv would fall within days, Russian forces not only managed to take the capital, but withdrew after facing Ukrainian counter-attacks.

Today, many Russian forces have consolidated to the east and southeast, focusing more on the Donbass while continuing focused attacks on cities such as Mariupol. Russian missile strikes continue across the country and the Russian government has threatened to target Western military supplies that continue to hit the country. After Russia's failure to deal a fatal blow to Ukraine in late February and early March, the war is now developing into a protracted conflict, with civilians increasingly targeted or caught in crossfire.

No military plan ever matches the reality of the battlefield. But given the inaccuracy of many predictions about the course of the war, it is appropriate to reconsider the pre-war assumptions of Russia and Ukraine, as well as the major factors explaining the foil of Russia's initial strategy.. The Russian plan did not take into account the intensity and flexibility of Ukraine's initial defense, the resilience of critical systems (including command and control systems and air defense systems) and the resilience of the Ukrainian people in general.

Starting Assumptions

According to the media, Putin's decision to invade Ukraine was made only in February and the creation of forces along the border (including Belarus) may have been just an exercise or prelude to a more limited occupation of the country. Yes Putin's personal decision. In the absence of any provocation, the scale of the operation shocked many Ukrainian and Russian soldiers.

In Ukraine, after eight years of conflict with Russia and amid the emotional tension and exhaustion associated with an intense information war against the population, some believed there would be a massive attack, even in the security expert community. No. While other governments warned of the imminent possibility of a large-scale invasion, few measures were taken to contain the attack.

Meanwhile, the Russian army was also not adequately prepared for a large-scale offensive. The number of battle groups mobilized by the Russian Federation was insufficient to conquer a large country like Ukraine. This is particularly the case given Ukraine's geography, the numerical and qualitative composition of its security forces (very different from those faced by Russia in 2014), the training of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, its eight years of combat experience and the largest deployment was. A big number of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. However, high-ranking Russian politicians believed that relatively small troops could achieve large-scale strategic results, perhaps in the hope that the Russian army's high mobility and use of advanced technology would compensate for the manpower shortage. Most likely, the Russian government assumed that it would soon overthrow the Ukrainian army.

Initial Moves

After a massive rocket attack on key targets in Ukraine's defense infrastructure, Russian troops, together with troops from the so-called People's Republic of Lugansk and Donetsk (LPR and DPR), went on the offensive by attacking Pripyat and Chernihiv from the north (Belarus). from the area of From the east in Konotop, Sumy, Kharkiv and Akhtyrka, Line of contact with the LPR and DPR in Kharkiv and Akhtyrka, as well as Stanitsa Luganskaya, Volnovakha and Mariupol.

During the first forty-eight hours, Russian forces took control of the land island, Henichesk, Novaya Kakhovka and the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, as well as the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. They tried to launch a helicopter attack at Antonov Corporation Airport, two kilometers from the Kyiv suburb of Hostomel, with additional ground troops moving towards Konotop, Sumy, Akhtyrka, Kharkiv and Kherson. By the end of the first few days, Russian forces had driven out of Belarusian territory and joined the heavily competing Hotmail landing force and blocked Kyiv from the west, reaching the outskirts of Chernihiv and taking Melitopol. Ground and air strikes met stronger-than-expected resistance and failed to consolidate territory within the capital.

Meanwhile, Russia launched massive air and missile strikes on Ukraine aimed at hitting critical nodes in Ukraine's defense systems. But the first rocket attack failed to overwhelm the Ukrainian troops. The Ukrainian Air Force warned of attacks, lifting most of its aircraft into the air, to avoid destruction while on the ground. The air defense command and control system was not inefficient, which prevented Russia from gaining air superiority. Meanwhile, Russia's missile stockpile has decreased significantly. This later made it difficult for them to conduct large-scale attacks with modern, high-precision long-range weapons.

In some operational areas, Russian troops have entered Ukraine for tens or even hundreds of kilometers. But after facing the formation of defensive knots in the back, he was forced to retreat. This success of logistics and supply lines has become one of the distinguishing features of the Ukrainian defense. Well-organized resistance centers were located behind enemy lines, allowing attacks by Ukrainian units of special operations forces, slowing the advance of Russian troops into Ukraine. Meanwhile, Ukraine's Special Operations Forces have begun to effectively destroy Russian command personnel through the geographic location of unsecured communications. Small mobile tactical groups based on the basic system of nodal fortress and city defense also helped prevent the Russian army from encircling and capturing significant forces.

Since then, the combat action in many places has turned into a prolonged battle. Russian troops did not maneuver in such a way as to expose their advancing units, but at the same time they did not significantly increase their troops to conduct offensive actions in unexpected directions. The Russian army also failed to encircle large concentrations of Ukrainian troops and build their so-called "boilers". Instead, when the Russian government announced the end of the first phase of its operation, the Russian military stopped long-range artillery and bombardment without any significant offensive action. Despite withdrawing from the Kyiv region, Russian forces have been particularly embroiled in local fighting against stranded Ukrainian troops in urban areas of eastern Ukraine.

Regular and Irregular Warfare

Irregular troops, especially voluntary and field units, played an important role in this phase of the war and are likely to play a larger role in the spring and summer. The actions of Ukraine's Special Operations Forces and Special Services, including in the Ukrainian occupied territories, were particularly important, as they helped organize routine actions and national resistance behind enemy lines. During the early weeks of the invasion, this took the form of cutting off supply lines behind advancing formations. In the future, this could take the form of sabotaging fuel and ammunition depots, deduction of Russian communications, and organizing resist in occupied Ukrainian cities. These actions help to exploit Ukraine's disparate advantages in operational intelligence and information operations and to boost local morale.

In many ways, the Officer Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and to a large extent the Russian Army, follow classic 20th-century concepts and principles, highlighting their ability to systematically apply non-kinetic and distant warfare technologies. limits. Without a decisive and flexible technological advantage, the Russian army must rely on numerical superiority, but will struggle to maintain it without full mobilization. For Ukrainian troops, urban warfare tactics favored the defender, but driving Russian troops out of occupied territories required more than conventional weapons. The most important weapons include control and reconnaissance and information systems, long-range air defense and missile defense systems, long-range remote weapons including reconnaissance and attack, and radar and counter-battery weapons. However, the most important thing is the training of Ukrainian personnel in the use of these technologies and in the effective planning and management of their application. This also requires the establishment of new support and maintenance centres.

Russian plans were based on broken leadership and a lack of public resolve, both within Ukraine and among international partners. Despite years of kinetic and informational attacks in Ukraine designed to destabilize society in line with hybrid war tactics, the Ukrainian public has remained remarkably united. Russian-speaking cities such as Kharkov have shown exceptional resilience, contrary to Kremlin expectations of support for ethnic Russians; Despite heavy attacks on civilians, cities such as Mariupol refused to surrender. All of these factors contributed to the foil of Russia's initial blitzkrieg strategies. They forced Russian troops to redefine their goals and resorted to brutal attacks on civilians. Putin has provoked a much longer conflict than he had anticipated or anticipated.